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Abstract 
 
The emergence of consumer-to-consumer (C2C) online marketplaces in China has greatly 
complicated the regulation of counterfeit goods.  Endemic information asymmetries, strong 
consumer demand for counterfeits, and conflicting economic interests have challenged the 
effectiveness of independent government regulation and marketplace self-regulation but also 
created conditions for co-regulation.  Using historical analysis, this thesis examines the evolution 
of government regulation and marketplace self-regulation of C2C counterfeits in China.  It 
assesses the forces that have driven the shifts in the regulatory paradigm, and evaluates the 
complexity of Chinese online counterfeit regulation.  The Chinese regulatory regime against fake 
goods online has been mostly shaped by the nation’s perceived economic interests and the 
business interests of the chief online commercial platform, Taobao.  This regime, moreover, has 
been gradually evolving from independent government regulation and marketplace self-
regulation toward co-regulation.  The well-developed regulatory paradigm, nonetheless, bears an 
expedient character, as regulators have often used the regulation to advance certain interests over 
the others.  The regulation of C2C online counterfeit in China also reveals the limits of and 
opportunities for transnational regulatory governance of online intellectual property.   
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I.  Introduction 
In September 2014, an electronic commerce (E-commerce) business group from China, 
Alibaba, launched the biggest IPO in history at the New York Stock Exchange.1  While 
audiences in the US marveled at its success, the company has not always received such praise in 
the West.  Instead, Alibaba, and especially its consumer-to-consumer (C2C) E-commerce 
marketplace, Taobao, has long suffered from criticism about the numerous counterfeit products 
listed and sold on the platform.  In 2011, the United States Trade Representatives (USTR) listed 
Taobao as a “notorious market” for counterfeiting American products.2  Although USTR 
removed Taobao from the list a year later, allegations of rampant counterfeit sales still remained 
a controversial matter for Taobao, complicating Alibaba’s pursuit of a New York-based IPO.3   
This thesis studies the history of government regulation and Taobao’s marketplace self-
regulation against counterfeit goods in c2c E-commerce in China.  It examines how the 
government and the marketplace responded to pervasive counterfeit sales and evaluates the 
complexities of online counterfeit regulation in light of theories of business regulation.  Since its 
inception, Taobao and the government have developed an evolving set of regulatory responses to 
the sales of fake wares.  This thesis finds that the regulatory regime has gradually evolved from 
independent government regulation and marketplace self-regulation to a co-regulatory regime.  
The steering forces of the institutional shifts have been the interests of participants in C2C E-
commerce, particularly Taobao’s perceived business interests and China’s domestic economic 
interests, as viewed by governmental officials.   
These perceived interests have also been the greatest barriers to the implementation of 
strong anti-counterfeit measures, rather than purely technical constraints posed by the nature of 
online commerce.  Although both the government and Taobao have established substantial rules 
and mechanisms to regulate counterfeits, their hesitancy to commit to rigorous and effective 
enforcement of these rules has reflected the regulators’ attempts to protect certain interests over 
the others—more specifically, to protect domestic interests over foreign, and direct business 
concerns over more indirect impacts on consumer confidence.   
The development of government regulation and market self-regulation in China further 
reveals the limits of international governance of intellectual property rights infringements in 
China.  The qualified efficacy of foreign pressure for greater enforcement against counterfeits 
demonstrates the limits of transnational regulation of intellectual property rights.  Foreign brand 
owners, who have no direct control over regulations in China, have had to rely heavily on 
intermediaries like Taobao to combat infringements of their rights.  By doing so, the brand 
owners also handed the prerogative to the intermediaries, who have selectively responded to 
these regulatory pressures in light of their own perceived best interests.   
As a historical analysis, this thesis relies on government documents, media reports, 
journals, newsletters, books, online social media such as forums and Weibo (the Chinese 
counterpart of Twitter).  To evaluate the prevalence of counterfeit goods on Taobao, I also 
conducted search experiments on Taobao for a number of brand name goods, using keywords of 
the original brand names as well as their abbreviations and alias counterfeit sellers used.  To gain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Alibaba Claims Title For Largest Global IPO Ever With Extra Share Sales,” Forbes, September 22, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/09/22/alibaba-claims-title-for-largest-global-ipo-ever-with-extra-share-sales/. 
2 The United States Trade Representative, “Out of Cycle Review of Notorious Markets,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
December 20, 2011, http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3215. 
3Brandon Conradis, “Chinese Internet Giant Lobbied to be Taken Off List of ‘Notorious Markets’,” OpenSecrets, September 27, 2013, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/chinese-internet-giant-lobbied-to-b/; Kelli B. Grant, “Can Alibaba knock out knockoffs,” CNBC, 
September 18, 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/id/102010154#; Melanie Lee, “Alibaba pledges to combat fake goods on its shopping portals,” 
Reuters, April 23, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/23/us-alibaba-ip-idUSBRE93M0EA20130423. 
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a deeper understanding about one instructive enforcement action, I also conducted interviews 
with two former clients of the involved online store.  However, I was not able to gain access to 
internal Taobao sources and government documents, which limits my ability to assess the 
motivations behind the regulations or to evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement, 
especially of government regulation.  Although my analysis of the motivations and enforcement 
efficacy are supported by other documentations and experiments, further research with access to 
the internal sources would greatly help to confirm the results of my study.  
This thesis only studies the regulation against counterfeit regular consumer goods, such 
as clothing, accessories, electronic products, and cosmetics.  It excludes the regulation of 
counterfeit health and safety related products such as food and drugs, or highly valuable assets 
such as artifacts and antiques.  The regulation of these products uses different mechanisms, 
involves different players, and generates different consequences.4   
This thesis begins with an introduction to the C2C E-commerce market and the issue of 
online selling of counterfeit consumer goods in China.  It proceeds with a discussion of the 
interests of key stakeholders, which explains their views about and responses to counterfeit 
regulation.  Then I examine scholarly suggestions about appropriate responses to C2C online 
counterfeit regulation through reference to theories of business regulation and E-commerce 
regulation.  The next section furnishes a descriptive analysis of the development of government 
regulation and Taobao’s self-regulation against counterfeit sales. This section maps out how 
government regulation, marketplace’s self-regulation, and their interactions evolved from 2006 
to early 2014, and examines the driving forces behind these transformations.  The last section 
further evaluates the complexity of C2C counterfeit regulation by assessing the achievements 
and limitations to current and past regulations, with a special focus on the issue of technical 
feasibility and a case study of one individual Taobao seller.  
 
 
II. Development of C2C E-commerce Market and Ensuing Challenge of Counterfeits 	  
C2C E-commerce emerged comparatively late in China but has developed quickly.  In 
1999, two Chinese graduates from Harvard business school established the first c2c website in 
China, EachNet (“Yiqu”).5  The new e-commerce model quickly gained popularity, and its 
promise attracted the attention of the world leading E-commerce website eBay.  In 2002, eBay 
formally partnered with EachNet and invested $30 million into it.6  In the meantime, other native 
C2C websites were burgeoning, the strongest of which was Taobao.  In 1999, Ma Yun founded 
the Alibaba Group, which first engaged in business-to-business (B2B) online commerce.  In 
2003, Alibaba expanded its business to C2C as Ma launched the Taobao website.7  From it its 
establishment, Taobao grew at a dizzying rate and soon became the leader in China’s c2c market.  
In February, 2004, Taobao topped the Chinalabs Internet Service Index ranking of personal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Furthermore, public discourses on fake regular consumer goods and on fake drugs and food have rarely overlapped.  While one might be 
expecting major food or drug safety incidents, such as the 2008 poisonous milk incident, to have a spillover effect on the general issue of 
counterfeiting, an examination of the media reports and public conversations related to the milk incident indicates no such impact.   
5 “How Did Taobao Beat EachNet [淘宝当年是如何干掉易趣的],” Foreign Trade, February 16, 2013, 
http://www.cn176.com/xinwen/waimao53728.html. 
6 “About EachNet [关于易趣]，”EachNet, http://www.eachnet.com/abouteachnet.html. 
7 Lanlan Liu, “Ma Yun Adjust the Structure of Alibaba Group [马云调整阿里集团架构],” BJ News: B03, July 24, 2012, Sohu IT, 
http://it.sohu.com/20120724/n348858245.shtml. 
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trading sites with a growth index as high as 768 percent, in contrast with the 78 percent of the 
runner-up eBay EachNet.8  In 2005, as Alibaba purchased Yahoo! China, Taobao acquired 
Yahoo! China’s C2C platform, Yipai.9 
Since its inception, Taobao has sustained rapid growth and gained remarkable popularity 
among Chinese consumers.  By 2006, Taobao occupied 80 percent of the C2C market share in 
China.10  Three years later, it had acquired over 170 million registered users, almost half of the 
384 million Internet users in China, and its annual transaction volume exceeded 200 billion RMB 
(approximately $29 billion).11  As of June 2012, it had over 800 million product listings and over 
500 million registered users.12  By 2013, the annual gross merchandise volume of Taobao 
reached 1.1 trillion RMB ($180 billion).13   Although online commerce has eliminated the 
geographical boundaries in many commercial transactions, Taobao’s sellers, both of genuine and 
counterfeit goods, are concentrated in southeastern China where the market economy is the most 
developed.14   
 
The graph below shows the gross merchandise volumes of Taobao in comparison to the 
Chinese E-commerce market from 2007 to 2013:15 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 XS, “Taobao Beat Its Peers and Leads in China’s CTC Market [淘宝网超过国内同类对手 领先中国 CTC 市场],” CCID, July 2, 2004, Sohu 
IT, http://it.sohu.com/2004/07/02/06/article220830642.shtml. 
9 “Review of the Ten-year History of Alibaba Goup [阿里巴巴集团十年历史和重大事件回顾],” imeigui, Janurary 15, 2013, Phoenix Technology, 
http://tech.ifeng.com/internet/special/mayun/content-4/detail_2013_01/15/21221192_0.shtml?_from_ralated;  Jian Yang, “Alibaba Purchased 
Entire Yipai’s Stock, Yipai’s Business Closed [阿里收购一拍全部股份 一拍停止所有经营活动],” yesky, January 23, 2006, TechWeb, 
http://www.techweb.com.cn/news/2006-01-23/38036.shtml. 
10 Shaoxun Wang, “Survey Shows Taobao Occupies 80% of the Market, while Paipai Less than 3% [调查称 C2C 市场淘宝份额高达 80% 拍拍
网不足 3%],” Net Ease, April 16, 2007, http://tech.163.com/07/0416/10/3C6OMECU000915BF.html. 
11 Taobao press release, “Taobao to Help Small Businesses to Grow More Effectively,” Alibaba Group, March 31, 2010, 
http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/news/press_pdf/p100331.pdf. 
12 Taobao press release, “Motion Picture Association and Taobao Marketplace Sign Joint Initiatives to Address Online Sale of Infringing 
Content,” Alibaba Group, September 7, 2012 http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/news/press_pdf/p120907.pdf. 
13 Ran Tao, “Tmall GMV Reached 441 Billion in 2013, and Taobao 1.1 Trillion [天猫 2013 年成交额 4410 亿 淘宝成交额 1.1 万亿],” Tencent, 
June 18, 2014, Linkshop, http://www.linkshop.com.cn/web/archives/2014/292636.shtml. 
14 Xianwen Wang and Shenmeng Xu, “Geographical Distribution of Taobao C2C Stores [中国 C2C 淘宝网络店铺的地理分布],” Progress in 
Geography 30, no.12 (2011): 1564-1569; “China Daily: Online Shopping Plagued by Infringing Activities, Nine Administrations Take Actions 
Against Infringement and Threaten to Close Down Illicit Stores [中国日报网：网络购物侵权严重九部门联合严打严重者停网],” China 
Daily, July 4, 2011, China Anti-Counterfeiting and Rights Infringing Working Group, 
http://www.ipraction.cn/2012/03/23/ARTI1332477399593329.shtml. 
15 Data for this graph are drawn from: Dick Wei and Evan Zhou, “China eCommerce: Early Stage of Gold Rush—Where Does Value Lie,” JP 
Morgan Asia Pacific Equity Research, November 7, 2012: 30, retrieved from 
https://mm.jpmorgan.com/EmailPubServlet?h=d26i7b2n&doc=GPS-978560-0.pdf;  “Gross merchandise volume (GMV) of online shopping in 
China from 2006 to 2013 (in billion yuan),” statista, http://www.statista.com/statistics/300964/china-online-shopping-gross-merchandise-
volume/; “Taobao’s gross merchandise volume from 2nd quarter 2012 to 3rd quarter 2014 (in billion yuan),” statista, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/323075/taobao-quarterly-gross-merchandise-volume-gmv/. 
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While the C2C online market mushroomed, it gave new life to the old problem of 
counterfeit fraud.  China has long been criticized internationally for producing and distributing 
counterfeit goods.  The country’s heavy reliance on manufacturing, the government’s weak 
enforcement of intellectual property laws, and a general lack of awareness of intellectual 
property rights all facilitated the producing and selling of counterfeits.  According to the World 
Customs Organization, of the world’s counterfeit goods seized from 2008 to 2010, 75 percent 
were produced in East Asia, mostly in China.16   In some cases, the same factories that produce 
genuine brand name goods also produce counterfeits with the exact same materials, designs, and 
even quality.   
The openness, flexibility, and information asymmetry of C2C online market provided 
favorable conditions for sellers of counterfeit goods.  In a recent online survey by China’s 
Central Television (CCTV), 75.5 percent of the 25,200 survey participants reported that they had 
purchased such goods online.17  In 2011, Taobao received as many as 63.2 million claims of 
trademark infringing sales.18  The number grew to 87 million in 2012, reaching about ten percent 
of the total 800 million product listings on Taobao.19  Some of the most successful sellers on 
Taobao, moreover, made their fortunes by selling counterfeit goods.  For instance, Xiao Anna, 
whose success story inspired many young people to start their own business on Taobao, turned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, “Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment,” UNODC, 
April 2013: ix, retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOCTA_EAP_web.pdf.  
17  “CCTV: More Than 70% Surveyed have Purchased Counterfeits Online [央视：7成多网友网购过假货],” CCTV, August 26, 2014, Phoenix 
News, http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20140826/12999875_0.shtml. 
18 "Taobao Processed 63.2 Million Infringing Claims in 2011 [淘宝网：2011 年共处理侵权信息 6320 万条]," China News, March 12, 2012, 
http://finance.chinanews.com/it/2012/03-12/3736354.shtml; Taobao press release, “Motion Picture Association.”  
19  Jingru Yang, "Taobao Dealt with 87 Million Infringing Notices in the Last Year[淘宝网去年处理侵权信息 8700 万条]," Shenzhen News, 
March 12, 2013, China Economics, http://www.ce.cn/macro/more/201303/12/t20130312_24192203.shtml;  Taobao press release, “Motion 
Picture Association.” 
Figure 1: Gross Merchandise Volumes of Taobao and E-commerce in China 
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out to be a seller of counterfeits.  In 2010, the police uncovered her inventory of fake brand name 
apparel and arrested her for selling counterfeit goods.20 
 
 
III.  The Importance of Counterfeit Regulation—The Interests of Major Stakeholders 
 
Stakeholder interests in C2C counterfeit regulation are complex and multi-faceted.  The 
prevalence of counterfeits on Taobao disrupts fair and healthy market competition, hurts the 
legitimate interests of many E-commerce participants, and threatens the legitimacy of Taobao as 
a commercial entity.  However, as the thriving counterfeit trading on Taobao implies, not all 
participants in C2C online trading equally resent counterfeit goods—in fact, some welcome 
them.  The characteristics of C2C E-commerce and its regulation further complicate the issue, 
creating situations where participants develop ambivalent or even paradoxical views on 
counterfeits and counterfeit regulation.   
Clarifying the interests of the stakeholders is critical to understanding the development of 
regulatory responses to this issue.  Whereas action against counterfeit goods helps to constitute 
the emerging electronic market and corrects the market failure of fraudulent selling, regulators 
often face conflicting pressures and interests from an array of constituents.   
 
 
Consumers 
 
The selling of counterfeit goods has traditionally been regarded as a commercial fraud 
that hurts consumer interests.  On this view, buyers receive something worth less than they 
expect.  However, contrary to the traditional perception of counterfeiting as a business fraud, 
consumers in C2C online marketplaces in China cannot be simply regarded as the victims of 
counterfeiting.  Many consumers, through their demand for counterfeits, especially fake 
luxurious goods, have in fact become the accomplices of online counterfeiting.   
 Consumer sentiments toward counterfeits in C2C online marketplaces like Taobao are 
complicated and ambiguous, and largely contingent on the types of merchandise at issue.  In 
general, consumers of counterfeit brand name or luxury apparel and accessories tend to care less 
about the genuineness of the articles that they are purchasing, and may even actively seek out 
counterfeits.  To these consumers, the biggest draw of counterfeits is the low price.  Affordable 
shoes and bags that plausibly pass as the real brand name articles have almost certainly lured 
millions of consumers into purchasing counterfeits on Taobao.  As one consumer commented to 
a local reporter on his purchase of fake Nike shoes, “Of course I know they are knockoffs—but 
these shoes only cost 185 RMB, and they would cost 1250 RMB in department stores!”21   
Consumers of cosmetics and electronic goods, on the other hand, tend to be more wary of 
counterfeits.  More consumers have expressed concern over counterfeit beauty products and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Yinchan Yan, “ The Entrepreneurial Fairy Tale of Taobao Seller Xiao Anna: From Selling Counterfeits to Having a Brand of Her Own (2) [淘
宝姑娘肖安娜创业童话：从卖A货到自有品牌(2)],” Business, June 10, 2011, Phoenix News, 
http://finance.ifeng.com/gem/story/20110610/4134288.shtml; Xiaochen, “Ma Yun: In Memory of the Vanished Taobao Seller Xian Anna  [马云:
纪念 1 位消失的淘宝店主肖安娜],” Xiaochen’s Blog (blog), October 22, 2010 (11:34:51 a.m.), 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_7068335f0100ns20.html. 
21 Jinghua Jia, “Taobao’s Counterfeit Plague: a Deadlock with No Solution [淘宝假货泛滥：一个无解的死局],” Baidu Baijia, September 8, 
2014, http://jiaweb.baijia.baidu.com/article/28698. 
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electronic products.  On online forums and the Chinese counterpart of Twitter, Weibo, 
consumers who had been cheated into buying counterfeit beauty and electronic products have 
frequently complained and posted about the fraudulent sellers.  Some more indignant consumers 
even made lists of fraudulent sellers on online forums, blogs and Weibo.22  The characteristics of 
beauty and electronic goods lend themselves to greater consumer concern about counterfeiting.  
With these goods, counterfeiting is more prone to affect safety or functionality than clothing and 
accessories.  Low-quality fake cosmetics can put their consumers’ wellness at risk.  Knockoff 
electronic products, according to the consumer complaints online, tend to be sold at prices 
similar with the genuine ones, but the counterfeits often perform poorly or turn out to be 
unusable. 
  
 
Sellers 
 
Sellers on Taobao also have mixed attitudes toward the prevalence of counterfeit goods 
on the platform.  Action against counterfeit selling would supposedly protect legitimate sellers 
and undercut illicit sellers.  As a result, the latter tend to oppose strong anti-counterfeit 
regulations.  Nevertheless, regulations with weakly enforced rules do not bother many illicit 
sellers.  While some of them are simply untouched by Taobao’s and the government’s restricted 
enforcement capacity, others have developed effective strategies for circumventing the 
regulation.  
Intriguingly, while legitimate sellers applaud effective regulation against the counterfeit 
goods that compete unfairly with their businesses, they sometimes resent the regulation even 
more than counterfeit sellers do.  Legitimate sellers suffer when the regulation overreaches.  
They are often unduly burdened when the regulators apply stringent restrictions indiscriminately 
to all sellers online, raising their costs and forcing them to implement selling policies that expose 
them to unscrupulous buyers.   
 
 
Brand Owners 
 
While consumers and sellers possess ambiguous attitudes toward counterfeit regulation 
on Taobao, brand owners, whose interests are directly undermined by counterfeits, have been at 
the forefront of advocacy for counterfeit regulation.  Both domestic and foreign manufacturers 
and retailers of branded goods have urged Taobao to strengthen its counterfeit regulation and 
collaborated with Taobao in anti-counterfeit initiatives and campaigns.  Unlike consumers and 
sellers, who have some reservations about counterfeit regulation, brand owners appear to 
uniformly view counterfeits on Taobao as threats to undercut their brand values and legitimate 
business.   
Although domestic brand owners have contributed to promoting counterfeit regulation on 
Taobao, foreign brand owners, especially American and European luxury, beauty, and sports 
producers, have played a more active role.  Many brand owners, such as Mary Kay, Adidas, 
Chanel, and Bose B.V., have, at different times, provided specific information about counterfeit 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For instance, a blogger made a list of fake beauty products sellers on Sina Blogs at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_52fed4b80100ak4w.html, 
and a consumer who purchased fake iPhone accessories exposed detailed information about his interaction with the seller on Taobao’s forum at 
http://bbs.taobao.com/catalog/thread/154501-253528599.htm. 
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listings to Taobao and urged it to take them down.23  Apart from these regular collaborations, 
Coach and Louis Vuitton have signed MOUs with Taobao in 2011 and 2013 respectively, 
establishing formal partnerships with the website and urging it to enforce active prevention and 
policing policies.24   
Foreign businesses’ intense efforts to press Taobao for more stringent regulation also 
reflect broader concerns about China’s weak intellectual property protections.   According to the 
2011 Business Climate Survey conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce in the 
People's Republic of China (AmCham-China), two thirds of the surveyed American business 
believed that intellectual property rights protection was crucial to their business in China.  70 
percent of the respondents complained that China’s intellectual property rights protection was 
ineffective.25   
The vital interests of these foreign businesses have also triggered pressure from foreign 
governments and international organizations.  USTR included Taobao in its “notorious market” 
list of 2011 in order to pressure Taobao to take further anti-counterfeiting measures against 
counterfeit American products.  When the American agency removed Taobao from this list, it 
still urged Taobao “to further streamline procedures for submitting and responding to 
notifications to decrease the time required for taking down listings of counterfeit and pirated 
goods and to continue its efforts to work with and achieve a satisfactory outcome with U.S. 
rights holders and industry associations.”26  In 2013, Taobao also signed an agreement with the 
International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition (IACC), a US-based non-profit organization that 
represented business interests in trademark infringement. 27   
 
 
The Government 
 
Despite some moves toward improving public access to the outcomes of governmental 
decision-making, internal processes of the Chinese state remain shrouded from public view.  The 
debates that shape government rule-making rarely receive airings through public hearings or 
press coverage. With limited access to the government’s policy-making deliberations, it is 
difficult to reach definitive conclusions about the government’s stance on the regulation of 
online counterfeit sales.  However, a glimpse of the history of intellectual property rights in 
China offers a way to understand where the government stands.  
The development of Chinese intellectual property rights laws since the 1970s has been 
marked by two key concepts—perceived domestic economic interests and external pressure.  The 
Chinese government established the modern legal framework of intellectual property rights in 
part to legitimize China’s economic reform in the late 1970s.  The introduction and reform of 
China’s early intellectual property laws served primarily to attract foreign investment and was 
part of the package to establish bilateral trade relation with the United States.  Later, as China 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “ Taobao Releases Monthly Result in Combating Counterfeits, receiving 462 reports in total [淘宝公布一个月打假结果 共接到 462 封举报
信],” Sohu IT, December 24, 2009, http://it.sohu.com/20091224/n269177168.shtml.s 
24Hui Zhou, “ Many Luxurious Brands Slows Down Retail Expansion, LV Cooperate with Taobao to Fight Counterfeits [多个奢侈品牌将缩减开店 
LV与淘宝联合打假],”  Guangzhou Daily, July 8, 2014, Phoenix News, http://nb.ifeng.com/gngj/detail_2014_07/08/2555829_0.shtml; J.T. Quigley, 
“Taobao to Crack Down on Fake Louis Vuitton Goods,”  The Diplomat, October 11, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/taobao-to-crack-
down-on-fake-louis-vuitton-goods/.  
25 "Regulatory Barriers, Indigenous Innovation Policies Pose Threat to Companies in China." U.S.Newswire, Mar 21, 2011. 
26 The United States Trade Representative, “Out of Cycle Review of Notorious Markets,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
December 13, 2012, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/121312%20Notorious%20Markets%20List.pdf.  
27 “IACC and Taobao Marketplace Sign Agreement to Combat Counterfeiting Online,” IACC, August 15, 2013, 
http://www.iacc.org/announcements/international-anticounterfeiting-coalition-and-taobao-marketplace-sign-agreement-to-combat-counterfe. 
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joined the WTO in the 1990s, it confronted insistent demands that it strengthen its intellectual 
property rights enforcement, especially from the US and international trade organizations.  
Meanwhile, Chinese politicians and businessmen shaped intellectual property policies in the 
hopes of benefiting the development of domestic economy.  On one hand, the government 
deliberately adopted loose enforcement regimes for intellectual property rights laws, so that the 
country’s economy could absorb and internalize knowledge from abroad.  On the other hand, as 
some Chinese businesses began to feel hurt by the lack of intellectual property rights protection, 
they pressured the government for more effective protection, with some results.28  On the whole, 
the Chinese government has viewed intellectual property rights primarily as an economic tool.  
Although it was frequently pressured by foreign as well as domestic interests to strengthen 
intellectual property rights protection, its responses consistently sought to maximize short-term 
domestic economic development.   
The domestic economic focus of China’s intellectual property rights law enforcement 
provides the government incentives to both regulate and tolerate counterfeits on Taobao.  First, 
as the vice director of the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) pointed out in 2012, Chinese 
companies were becoming growingly conscious of the usefulness of intellectual property in a 
competitive market economy, demonstrated by an increase in intellectual property lawsuits.  As a 
result, they demanded stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights laws and a better 
intellectual property environment in China.29  These domestic businesses may well push the 
Chinese government to strengthen intellectual property protection, which entails more stringent 
regulation of online counterfeit goods.   
At the same time, the domestic economic focus can also propel the government to give 
Taobao considerable leeway to deal with the counterfeits on its own.  Taobao’s parent company 
Alibaba occupies 80 percent of the Chinese E-commerce market and contributes to about two 
percent of the country’s GDP, and Taobao alone creates millions of jobs for self-employed 
entrepreneurs, arguably with significant positive spillover effects on consumer demand.30  Thus, 
if the Chinese government is to prioritize the development of domestic economy, it has strong 
incentives to attend to Alibaba’s and Taobao’s interests.  Foreign businesses have also noticed 
the government’s bias toward Chinese businesses.  American businesses represented by 
AmCham-China, for instance, have complained that Chinese government regulations 
systematically favor local firms compared to foreign businesses.31  
External pressures from foreign businesses, governments, and international organizations, 
by contrast, create incentives for the Chinese government to tighten its regulation against online 
counterfeits.  Counterfeits have arguably hurt China’s reputation more badly than the economy.  
Concern about China’s global standing gives the government additional reason to answer to the 
foreign pressure with more rigorous regulation and enforcement against online counterfeits and 
other intellectual property infringing activities.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28Andrea Wechsler, "Intellectual Property Law in the PR China: A Powerful Economic Tool for Innovation and Development," Max Planck 
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper 09-02 (2008). 
29 Trevor Little, “The Chinese companies pushing the brand boundaries,” World Trademark Review, December 3, 2013, 
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Blog/detail.aspx?g=07cf20d7-7e45-4f4a-9fda-1b1483ec9d68. 
30 Charles Clover, “Alibaba growth slows ahead of IPO,” The Financial Times, January 29, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bc0b529c-88ae-
11e3-9f48-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Gcq4i1o7; Lara Logan, “Jack Ma Brings Alibaba to the U.S.,” CBS NEWS, September 28, 2014, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/alibaba-chairman-jack-ma-brings-company-to-america/. 
31 "Regulatory Barriers, Indigenous Innovation Policies."  
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Taobao (The Marketplace)  
 
Counterfeits, therefore, both benefit and threaten Taobao’s business interests as Taobao 
interacts with stakeholders whom have different views on counterfeits and counterfeit regulation.  
Below is an illustration of the major counterparties and stakeholders in Taobao’s business, their 
attitudes toward counterfeits, and their relationships and interactions with Taobao:
 
 
As an online retail service provider, Taobao first and foremost needs to cater to the 
interests of its users to achieve business success.  The users’ ambiguous interests in counterfeit 
goods provide perhaps the greatest incentive for Taobao to maintain flexible regulation.  Some 
Taobao consumers want action against sellers of counterfeit goods or more generous policies 
about returns and the handling of consumer complaints, but millions of Chinese consumers 
continue to demand access to cheap counterfeits, especially of knockoffs of luxury goods.  
Moreover, the strength of Taobao as a C2C online marketplace lies largely in its open and 
flexible environment.  As we will see, the adoption of regulations frequently stirs up discontent 
among sellers and threatens to drive them away from Taobao.  Thus, if Taobao imposes more 
stringent regulatory standard or substantially strengthens the enforcement of existing standards, it 
will risk alienating more sellers.   
While Taobao juggles the contradictory regulatory demand from its users, the upward 
regulatory pressure from brand owners compels it to respond with more stringent regulation.  As 
Figure 2: Relationships Between Taobao and the Major Counterparties/Stakeholders in Its Business 
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mentioned before, many brand owners have reported counterfeit listings to Taobao and urged it 
to take them down, while some have formally partnered with Taobao to combat counterfeits.  
Some brand owners, like the Chinese lingerie brand Finer and the Swiss luxurious watch 
producer Omega, have taken more aggressive means by filing lawsuits against Taobao and the 
individual counterfeit sellers.32  Although none of the lawsuits exerted any significant impact on 
Taobao’s business, they were detrimental to Taobao’s reputation, especially outside China.  
However, Taobao’s business interests also conflict with the brand owners’ interests.  
While the interests of the brand owners are best served when Taobao removes all the counterfeit 
listings, Taobao benefits by preserving some counterfeit goods online to attract a greater number 
of users.  Furthermore, the brand owners’ definition of intellectual property rights infringement 
is sometimes at odds with Taobao’s.  Many brand owners broadly define counterfeits as any 
items sold by unlicensed retailers that bear their trademarks. On such grounds, some brand 
owners, such as Finer, have requested Taobao to remove not only the knockoffs but also genuine 
products sold by unlicensed sellers. 33  Such requests clash with the essence of C2C E-commerce, 
which is to provide trade platform for free and unaffiliated individuals, including discounters, 
and Taobao has chosen to guard the fundamental interests of C2C marketplace, as it did in the 
case of Finer.34  
Taobao itself also suffers from the negative consequences of counterfeit sales on its site.   
Regardless of what others demand, counterfeits are, after all, illegal.  Thus, Taobao is obliged to 
delegitimize counterfeits explicitly in its policies in order to legitimize its business.  Moreover, 
the pervasive sales of counterfeits on Taobao also became a significant barrier to Alibaba’s 
pursuit of launching IPO in the US stock market.  In an interview, Taobao’s founder and former 
CEO, Ma, expressed his grievances over the accusations about Taobao’s inaction against 
counterfeits on its site, “Taobao does not produce counterfeits,” he observed. “Counterfeits 
produced by society are just more visible on Taobao.  There is no way I can eliminate them, 
because I am not law enforcement and I cannot put the counterfeit sellers in prison.”35   
 
 
IV. Theoretical Solutions to C2C Online Counterfeit Regulation  
 
Although the major stakeholders in C2C E-commerce have demonstrated complicated 
and even paradoxical interests in counterfeit regulation, counterfeit sales on Taobao and 
inadequate regulation clearly harm the legitimate interests of consumers, sellers, brand owners, 
and the marketplace itself.  Allowing counterfeits to thrive freely on Taobao can never be the 
ultimate solution, yet Taobao’s need to balance the interests of its users and the characteristics of 
C2C E-commerce have made counterfeit regulation a real challenge.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 “ Omega Sues Taobao for Selling Counterfeits, Bringing Price Filtering System Under the Spotlight [欧米茄起诉淘宝售假 网店价格过滤机
制成焦点],”Economics Obersver, July 21, 2011, Sina , http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20110721/135310192058.shtml; Xiaoli Lin and Dongdong 
Suo, “Finer Sues Taobao for Counterfeits [芳奈儿状告淘宝售假],” Guangzhou Daily, April 6, 2011, http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/html/2011-
04/06/content_1312744.htm. 
33 Qiuyang He, “Controversies Surrounds Finer’s Lawsuit Against Taobao [芳奈儿淘宝“打假”存异议],” Information Times, December 21, 
2010, NetEase, http://tech.163.com/10/1221/04/6ODB915L000915BF.html. 
34 Ibd. 
35 “Ma Yun Replies to Blames on Taobao’s Counterfeits: I Cannot Eliminate Counterfeits [马云回应淘宝造假指责：我没办法把假货打掉],” 
Tencent, December 18, 2010, http://tech.qq.com/a/20101218/000132.htm. 
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But online counterfeiting is not a challenge unique to Chinese E-commerce.  The advent 
of C2C E-commerce in the late 1990s exacerbated the problem of counterfeit sales worldwide.  
The problem of online counterfeits has captured the attention of scholars, who studied the nature 
of C2C online sales of counterfeit goods and proposed regulatory solutions.   
It is worth noting that most of the studies on C2C counterfeit regulation are premised on 
asymmetric information, which entails two aspects.  First, information distribution tends to be 
asymmetric between buyers and sellers, and deceptive sellers can easily exploit buyer’s 
information disadvantages by manipulating their displayed product information through 
mimicking the representations of authentic products.36  Second, asymmetric information exists 
between regulators, including both the marketplace and the government, and deceptive sellers.  
Due to their anonymity, counterfeiters in online markets are more difficult to identify than 
counterfeiters in traditional markets.37  Nonetheless, one cannot simply assume that consumers 
have no means of identifying counterfeit goods online.  In many cases, the extraordinarily low 
prices of counterfeits, especially counterfeit luxuries, send clear signals to both buyers and 
regulators.  And as the analysis of consumer interests has shown, many fake luxury consumers 
consciously purchase counterfeits on Taobao. 
 
i.  The Role of Government and Marketplaces in Online Counterfeit Regulation 	  
Scholars have generally reached a consensus that the government can assist the growth of 
E-commerce through provision a strong rule of law.  In an early study of E-commerce readiness, 
Oxley and Yeung acknowledged that information asymmetry, exacerbated by low costs of entry 
and exit in the online market, was an inherent feature of E-commerce that led to transaction 
hazards.  Based on a cross-sectional analysis of empirical data from 30 countries, they concluded 
that the institutional environment, a critical component of which was the rule of law, was crucial 
to the healthy development of E-commerce.38  In the examination of how E-commerce law 
should be formulated in the United States, Ribstein and Kobayashi argued that E-commerce 
should be ruled by state law rather than by federal law.  The flexibility and variability of state 
laws, along with the competition among states’ legislatures, would help the regulatory 
approaches to the newly emerged E-commerce industry evolve into the optimal form.39  The 
principle that underlay their arguments was to avoid overregulation, which could hamper the 
efficiency and free transaction flow of E-commerce—a principle that reflected the neoliberalism 
that had dominated commercial regulation and sustained the standard of caveat emptor in many 
aspects of US commerce for the past four decades.   
Some scholars disagreed with upholding the caveat emptor principle in E-commerce, but 
still held that the marketplaces were in the best position to regulate due to the information 
asymmetry inherent in E-commerce.  Snyder maintained that the caveat emptor principle would 
not work in E-commerce market because consumers would not have the chance to inspect the 
merchandise until they received them after payment.  Drawing from the lessons of pay-per-call 
regulations, he concluded that governments must provide a legal framework that could guide the 
E-commerce industry in regulating against fraud. Yet despite acknowledging the value of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Tamilla Mavlanova and Raquel Benbunan-Fich, "Counterfeit Products on the Internet: The Role of Seller-Level and Product-Level 
Information," International Journal of Electronic Commerce 15, no. 2 (2010): 79-104. 
37 Herbert J. Hammond and Justin S. Cohen, "Intellectual Property Issues in E-Commerce," Tex.Wesleyan Law Review 18, (2011): 750. 
38 Joanne E. Oxley and Bernard Yeung, "E-Commerce Readiness: Institutional Environment and International Competitiveness," Journal of 
International Business Studies 32, no. 4 (2001): 705-723. 
39 Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, "State Regulation of Electronic Commerce," Emory Law Journal 51 no.1, (2002): 1-82. 
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government regulation, he still maintained that the ultimate liability to oversee the business must 
fall on the auction houses, which possessed information advantage to regulate efficiently and 
effectively.40  Chua and Wareham responded to Snyder’s study by further examining the self-
regulation of online auction houses.  They found that the auction houses were indeed in the best 
position to oversee the auctions due to information asymmetry.41  However, contrary to Snyder’s 
claim that self-regulation was insufficient, they discovered that the online auction industry had in 
fact established sophisticated formal and informal regulatory institutions to fight auction fraud.   
Formal institutions, which aimed at restraining behaviors, included: occasional referrals to the 
police in egregious cases; reputation systems based on consumer feedback, usually through 
rating their experiences with sellers; complaints to auction houses; insurance provision; and 
escrow mechanisms.  Informal approaches to reduce asymmetric information ranged from 
reliance on intermediaries, collectives, self-interest, charity, and vigilante action in response to 
problematic transactions.42  However, despite their findings and their support for self-regulation, 
Chua and Wareham also recognized the limits of these institutions, particularly their weakness in 
protecting new entrants in the market.43  
 
 
ii.  The Limits of Marketplaces’ Self-regulation 	  
The existing literature reflects a rough scholarly consensus that government should step 
back while marketplaces should take the lead in counterfeit regulation in C2C E-commerce. 
Despite such consensus, E-commerce marketplaces have in fact faced significant limits in 
implementing effective self-regulation.   
The 2008 American court decision in Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., for example, 
acknowledged the limits in the marketplaces’ self-regulation against counterfeit sales.  In this 
case, the court ruled that eBay was not liable for the trademark infringements by the numerous 
counterfeit Tiffany products sold on its website, because eBay’s general knowledge about the 
counterfeits on its website did not suffice to inform it of the specific infringements or to impose 
on it the burden to take affirmative actions.44  Scholars approved of the court’s decision and 
advocated for statutory safe harbor provisions guaranteeing service providers like eBay to have 
limited liability, which would promote the growth and development of Internet Commerce. 45  
This judicial attempt to limit eBay’s liability reflected two major constraints in the marketplaces’ 
self-regulation:  information and costs. Even though compared with other regulatory players, 
marketplaces naturally possessed the most information about fraudulent transactions, that 
information is not necessarily sufficient for them to proactively inspect literally millions of 
online sellers for counterfeit wares.  To acquire sufficient information to do so, the marketplaces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 James M. Snyder, "Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should or Could to Stop Online Fraud," Federal 
Communications Law Journal 52, (1999):453-472. 
41 Cecil Eng Huang Chua and Jonathan Wareham, "Fighting Internet Auction Fraud: An Assessment and Proposal," Computer 37, no. 10 (2004); 
Chua, Cecil and Jonathan Wareham, "Self-Regulation for Online Auctions: An Analysis," ICIS 2002 Proceedings (2002): 115-125. 
42 Chua and Wareham, "Self-Regulation,": 119-122,124. 
43 Chua and Wareham, "Self-Regulation.” 
44 Elizabeth K. Levin, "A Safe Harbor for Trademark: Reevaluating Secondary Trademark Liability After Tiffany v. eBay," Berkeley Technolgy 
Law Journal 24, (2009): 502. 
45 Levin, “A Safe Harbor for Trademark:,” 491-527. 
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would have to involve in the transactions closely, which would arguably give rise to high 
administrative costs, potentially hampering the development of Internet commerce.46   
The business interests of the marketplaces also deter the implementation of effective self-
regulation.  The marketplaces need to maintain their reputation as open and free marketplaces; 
but this need to attract more users may give them the incentive to avoid strict policies toward 
fraudulent behaviors, especially if those behaviors accord with consumer preferences.47  
Tolerating the widespread sale of counterfeits may also attract more customers, especially in the 
context of fake luxury goods.  Consumers of such products may very well knowingly purchase 
counterfeit brand goods in order to acquire the social class status attached to the brand name at 
low costs.48 
The personal interests of the employees at the E-commerce companies may represent an 
even more powerful constraint on effective self-regulation.  A group of Chinese journalists 
revealed in April 2012 that a large proportion of employees at China’s largest C2C marketplace, 
Taobao, had been involved in serious corruption by taking bribes from counterfeit sellers.  These 
practices not only boosted the business of the counterfeit sellers but also directly harmed the 
business of legitimate sellers.  Although the managers of Taobao were fully aware of this 
corruption, they found it extremely difficult to effectively act against it without significantly 
undercutting their business in this rapidly expanding and changing industry.49 
 
 
iii.  C2C Counterfeit Regulation and Theories of Self-regulation 
 
The potential and problems of the marketplaces’ self-regulation against counterfeits in 
C2C E-commerce fit well into the broader discussion of business self-regulation.  Self-regulation 
is particularly useful when two conditions are met—the existence of some market failure, such as 
information asymmetry; and a clear cost advantage of self-regulation over traditional public 
regulation.50  Information asymmetry is inherent in the C2C E-commerce market, and the 
marketplaces’ significant access to information about buyers and sellers makes their self-
regulation against fraudulent transactions much cheaper than external, such as governmental, 
regulation.  Furthermore, the C2C marketplaces, like other businesses, ought to have the 
incentives to self-regulate against at least some fraudulent practices.  Self-regulation helps them 
preserve their business interests, such a reputation for fair dealing.  It may also deflect proposals 
for more intrusive and costly government intervention,51 and bolster competitive advantages.52 
However, attempts at the self-regulation of online counterfeit sales in China also 
challenge the established theories on effective self-regulation.  Scholars traditionally held the 
view that private interests of the business and public interests must coincide, either naturally or 
enforced by external pressure, for self-regulation to be reliable and effective.53  The central 	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problem of industry self-regulation, as Gunningham and Reese recognized, is the short-termism 
of much corporate management.54  However, with the high consumer demand for counterfeit 
luxurious goods and the indifference of many sellers about the issue, the Chinese marketplaces’ 
ineffective self-regulation of online counterfeits may actually be an effective response to both 
conflicting public interests and its own long-term business interests.  Nonetheless, the 
marketplaces’ intentional tolerance of counterfeits to attract sellers does demonstrate another 
potential weakness of self-regulation—the frequent unleashing of a “race to the bottom” in 
regulatory standards.55  
Another two critical steps towards building a successful self-regulatory regime are what 
Gunningham and Reese called developing “industrial morality” and “institutionalizing 
responsibility.”56 However, these two steps are difficult to bring out success in the marketplaces’ 
self-regulation against counterfeits.  “Industrial morality” requires establishing a normative 
framework similar to industry’s codes of conduct but fully compatible with the public interest.  
“Institutionalizing responsibility” extends beyond the former and asks to build the moral 
principles, such as transparency and accountability, into the corporation’s structures of decision-
making and operation.  However, C2C websites are different from other types of enterprises that 
self-regulate.  These online marketplaces host sales but don’t actually sell anything themselves.  
Hence, developing moral codes of conduct and institutionalizing them can at most improve the 
marketplaces’ regulatory capacity, but cannot restrain the sellers’ behaviors in the absence of 
extensive training or licensing programs that inculcate those norms in the numerous widely 
dispersed online sellers.  Embedding such morality and responsibility into the conduct of 
individual online sellers poses different, and maybe impossible, challenges. 
 
An examination of both the theoretical and empirical researches of E-commerce 
regulation and self-regulation in general suggests that marketplaces alone cannot solve the 
problem of online counterfeit sales, and that a multi-player regulatory paradigm is likely to be 
required.  Marketplaces’ self-regulation has strong merits and potential in fighting counterfeit 
fraud, yet it is unlikely to escape the prevailing weaknesses of business self-regulation.  The 
partial coincidence of public interests and marketplaces’ business interests only strengthens the 
need for the government to attend to those stakeholders whose interests are hurt by online 
counterfeits.  
 
 
V. Responses to C2C Market Counterfeits—Government Regulation and Marketplace Self-
Regulation in China 
   
Government regulation and Taobao’s private regulation against counterfeits on the C2C 
online marketplace both formally began in 2006, the same year Taobao took over 80 percent of 
the entire C2C market share in China.  As Chinese C2C E-commerce, led by Taobao, burgeoned 
in the years that followed, regulations of the enduring counterfeiting problem continued to 
intensify.  The development of both the public and the industry’s self regulatory paradigms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Gunningham and Rees, "Industry self‐regulation," 374. 
55 Ogus, "Rethinking Self-Regulation," 106.   
56 Gunningham and Rees, "Industry self‐regulation," 376-389. 
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followed a rather clear pattern—from building up regulatory infrastructure from scratch to 
strengthening regulatory enforcement, and, in the end, to greater collaboration, which potentially 
paved the way for the establishment of a co-regulatory paradigm.  Based on this pattern, the 
development of government regulation and marketplace self-regulation against C2C market 
counterfeits in China can be divided into three corresponding stages. 
 
A Brief Introduction of the Structure of the Chinese Government 
 
To grasp how government regulation against online counterfeits works, it is necessary to 
first understand how the government works.  Below is an illustration of the structure of the state 
governance of China: 
 
 
 
The State Council, also known as the Central People’s Government, leads and oversees 
the state and local administrative organs, as demonstrated in the diagram below.57  These 
administrative organs exercise administrative powers within designated areas, and they lead and 
oversee their provincial and local subordinates.58  They also have the power to make and enforce 
administrative orders, rules, and guidelines, which are legally binding but subject to the higher 
legal status of statutes and the Constitution.  In the absence of E-commerce legislations, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 “State Council of the People’s Republic of China,” The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/gwy_zzjg.htm. 
58 For more information on the structure of the government of China, visit the official government website www.english.gov.cn. 
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administrative laws are the primary guidelines to C2C counterfeit regulation.  Below is a 
simplified illustration of the structure of the State Council, along with the administrative 
agencies that have been the players in government regulation against online counterfeits: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The two primary state-level regulators are the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and 
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC).  The former is a ministerial 
authority under the State Council responsible for the policy-making pertaining to trade, 
commerce, foreign investment, and the market economy.59  The latter is an executive agency of 
the State Council responsible for market regulation and administrative law enforcement.60 
Other important enforcement agencies in online counterfeit regulation include the 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection, and Quarantine (AQSIQ).  The MPS is the central police department.  Like the 
Administrations for Industry and Commerce (AICs), the police are also in charge of investigating 
and confiscating counterfeit goods.  The former administer administrative penalties to those who 
violate administrative orders or civil laws; the latter take charge of cases that qualify as crimes, 
which involve producing or selling counterfeits worth more than 50,000 RMB.61  The AQSIQ is 
in charge of counterfeit regulation in production, whereas the SAIC is responsible for counterfeit 
regulation in transactions.62   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 “Mission,” Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/mission2010.shtml. 
60 “Mission,” State Administration for Industry and Commerce People’s Republic of China, http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/aboutus/Mission/ 
61 Pinbin Huang and Kechu Wang, “Police Receives Questions about Legitimacy to Investigate Counterfeiting, Authority Says the Police has the 
Responsibility [警方打假行动来质疑 相关部门:公安有单独打假权],” Guangxi News, May 22, 2006, Sina, http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2006-05-
22/10298992179s.shtml;   Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, Volume 2 Chapter 3 Section 1 Article 140 (2011).  
62 Weijian Zheng and Jiangping Fu, “ Three Ways to Conquer Counterfeit Mailing [三招点中“邮”假“死穴”],” China Quality News, May 27, 
2009, http://www.cqn.com.cn/news/zgzlb/diliu/261441.html.   
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Stage One: Building Regulatory Infrastructures (2006-2009) 
         
The year 2006 marked the beginning of counterfeit regulation in China.  A year before, 
the State Council released the State Council’s Opinions on Accelerating the Development of 
Electronic Commerce, which called for developing regulations for the newly emerged but 
quickly expanding online commerce.63  The MOFCOM responded by issuing the Ministry of 
Commerce’s Guidelines for Online Trading (Draft),64 which were ratified as the Ministry of 
Commerce’s Guidelines for Online Trading (Temporary) in 2007.  The Guidelines provided an 
encompassing guide to the development of E-commerce in a wide range of areas. It defined the 
roles of the participants in online trading, the basic legal and moral principles they should abide 
by and brief but comprehensive rules covering areas of privacy, payment security, intellectual 
property, consumer protection etc.  Although the Guidelines only required E-commerce 
participants to abide by the laws relevant to counterfeiting and respect intellectual property in the 
most general terms, it was a starting point of the government’s attempt to regulate counterfeits on 
the C2C market.65 
Taobao also began to build its own forces against counterfeits in 2006 by establishing a 
Security Department.  Like government regulation at this time, the Security Department oversaw 
a broad range of problems that threatened the security of transactions, accounts, and 
merchandise.66  In the years that followed, the Security Department would grow into a sizable 
department in Taobao and would play important roles in Taobao’s battle against counterfeits.  
The Security Department now contains several subdivisions, including Quality Control, 
Intellectual Property Protection, and Investigations.  Specialists in the department investigate 
consumer complaints and patrol the website with special attention to stores with bad ratings and 
high return rates.67   
During the following years, Taobao has made greater progress in establishing its self-
regulatory system.  Taobao monitored the prices of the goods and automatically took down those 
with abnormally fluctuating price.  By early 2009, it had an anti-counterfeit team of more than 50 
specialists. Taobao also established counterfeit reporting channels for both brand owners and 
consumers.  However, the ways it responded to the two types of complaints differed.  If brand 
owners issued official claims against specific products, Taobao would immediately delist them.  
If consumers filed reports, Taobao would investigate and delist the product only if it could verify 
the claims.68  The enforcement of the latter type, however, remains controversial even until today, 
as consumers often complain online about Taobao’s lack of attention to their reports.69   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, State Council’s Opinions on Accelerating the Development of Electronic 
Commerce 《国务院办公厅关于加快电子商务 发 展 的 若 干 意 见 》  (2005), retrieved from 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2005/content_63341.htm. 
64 “MOFCOM Asking for Public Opinions on Ministry of Commerce’s Guidelines for Online Trading (Draft) [商务部公开征求对《中华人民共
和国商务部关于网上交易的指导意见》（征求意见稿）的意见],” MOFCOM Department of Electronic Commerce and Informatization, May 
24, 2006, http://xxhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/af/200605/20060502278471.html.  In China, government agencies sometimes release drafts of the 
policies to the public or certain groups before the policies are ratified in order to solicit public opinions and suggestions. 
65MOFCOM, Ministry of Commerce’s Guidelines for Online Trading (Temporary)《商务部关于网上交易的指导意见（暂行）》  (2007), 
retrieved from http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/g/200704/20070404603124.html. 
66Rouxi, “Introduction of Taobao’s Security Department [淘宝安全部团队介绍],” Taobao BBS, August 22, 2012, 
http://bbs.taobao.com/catalog/thread/154504-258749098.htm. 
67 “TaobaoFighting Counterfeits [淘宝打假],” Dalian News Web, January 3, 2014, http://news.dlxww.com/news/content/2014-
01/03/content_1232432.htm; Jing Xiao, “Taobao vs. Counterfeits, A Secret Battle Involving 2000 Specialists [2000 多人专业打假 淘宝 Vs 假货 
一场你不知道的暗战],” Zhejiang News, January 2, 2014, http://zjnews.zjol.com.cn/system/2014/01/02/019788668.shtml. 
68 “Behind the Online Counterfeiting: A Battle between B2C and B2B Platforms [网络售假风波背后暗藏 与 C2C 平台之争],” Net Ease, 
February 19, 2009, China Market Order, http://www.12312.gov.cn/article/fangfan/anli/200902/1463156_1.html.  
69 These two conversation threads in online forums, Taobao BBS and Deyi, are samples of consumer complaints about Taobao’s inaction toward 
their reports: http://bbs.taobao.com/catalog/thread/154501-265616739--1636482543.htm; http://www.deyi.com/thread-4685371-1-1.html. 
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In 2008, Taobao opened up a business-to-consumer (B2C) website, first known as 
Taobao Mall and later as Tmall.70  This new site, easily accessible through Taobao, offered brand 
owners a platform to open up official stores.  Other sellers could also open up stores on Tmall, so 
long as they could meet Tmall’s financial and quality standards.  The establishment of Tmall 
constituted an important move in Taobao’s approach to counterfeit regulation.  The site required 
that all products listed to be authentic, and it imposed more stringent regulations than Taobao.71  
Through the establishment of Tmall, Taobao drew an explicit distinction between the two 
markets—one with low cost of entry but higher risk for quality, and another with high cost of 
entry but lower risk for quality.72  Through Tmall, Taobao could appease discontented brand 
owners by allowing them and their authorized retailers to compete with individual sellers on 
Taobao.  With its strict quality requirement, Tmall also reduced the information asymmetry 
between sellers and buyers, offering consumers a channel to purchase guaranteed authentic 
goods.     
By 2009, Taobao also developed several preventative mechanisms against counterfeit 
selling.  It mandated all sellers to register with authenticated national IDs.  The system would 
blacklist the IDs of sellers who were found selling counterfeits, preventing them from opening 
another store on Taobao for years or even permanently.  Taobao also implemented consumer 
protection policies that discouraged illicit selling.  For instance, if consumers lodged complaints 
against sellers, the sellers had the burden to prove the invalidity of the claims.  To the sellers who 
had joined a voluntary consumer protection program, Taobao had the right to issue buyers 
refunds worth three times the original price with funds from the sellers’ escrow account.73  
Despite these various internal regulatory efforts, counterfeit selling still remained 
prevalent on Taobao, leading some consumer activists to pressure Taobao to further strengthen 
its regulation.  In November 2009, an online activist and CEO of a public relation company, 
Huang Xiangru, founded an anti-online counterfeit organization named “Internet Counterfeit 
Fighters” and called for consumers, businesses, lawyers and government officials to join him in 
boycotting Taobao and other websites that sold counterfeits.  According to Huang, the 
organization received 7000 consumer complaints and filed complaint letters representing the 
French fashion company, Pierre Cardin, during the first three months of 2010.74  However, some 
Chinese commentators questioned the organization and criticized it for excessive propaganda 
and little substantial work.75  Huang might also have been operating primarily as a local front for 
foreign brand manufacturers.  Nonetheless, this activist, at the very least, contributed to raising 
public awareness of online counterfeiting and alerting C2C platforms like Taobao.  
Possibly stimulated by the growing domestic pressure, during the same month “Internet 
Counterfeit Fighters” was founded, Taobao announced its “100 Million Anti-Counterfeit Plan,” 
according to which Taobao would invest 100 million RMB (approximately $16 million) into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Jing Hu “ Tmall Tops the Rank of B2C Platforms Three Years Since Founding [淘宝商城成立 3 周年稳坐 B2C 第一平台],” Xin Wen Hua 
News, April 13, 2011, Hexun, http://tech.hexun.com/2011-04-13/128709644.html.  
71 “Tmall Rules [天猫规则],” Tmall, last modified October 10, 2014, http://rule.tmall.com/tdetail-146.htm?spm=0.0.0.0.pLPPGm&tag=self. 
72 Benli, “A Look at How Taobao Fights Counterfeits [看淘宝如何打假],] NetEase, March 2, 2011, 
http://tech.163.com/11/0302/08/6U4LK4L000094K1G.html. 
73 “ Behind the Online Counterfeiting: A Battle between B2C and B2B Platforms;” “Introduction to Consumer Protection Service [消费者保障服
务介绍],” Taobao Service Center, last modified September 18, 2014, http://service.taobao.com/support/seller/knowledge-1115307.htm. 
74 “Two Counterfeit Fighters Turned to Online Counterfeits on Taobao [两大打假人物交锋网络假货 矛头指向淘宝],” BJ News, Mach 15, 
2010, Tencent, http://tech.qq.com/a/20100315/000083.htm. 
75 “Internet Counterfeit Fighters Did Nothing in Its First Month, Internet Users Question Huang’s Purpose [网购打假团成立一月业绩为零 网友
质疑黄相如打假目的为赚钱],” Qingdao News, December 19, 2009, http://www.qingdaonews.com/content/2009-12/09/content_8230481.htm. 
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anti-counterfeiting operations that it promised to encompass all stakeholders.76  It also 
established an official anti-counterfeiting email account to receive consumer letters.77  The plan 
had an immediate impact.  By the end of December, the email account had received 462 letters, 
approximately 30 percent of which were counterfeit disputes.  Well-known brands such as Mary 
Kay also provided information about counterfeits to Taobao.78  
 
While Taobao established a new system of self-regulation, government officials in the 
MOFCOM were paying substantial attention to the legal frameworks and the limits of 
government regulation.  In 2008, the MOFCOM released the Specification for E-Business Model 
(Draft) and the Service Specification for Online Shopping Transactions (Draft).  Although like 
the previous MOFCOM Guidelines, the two Specifications covered a broad range of issues, they 
specified in much greater detail the obligations of E-commerce with regard to sale of counterfeit 
wares.  Both Specifications contained detailed stipulations requiring that all C2C online 
commerce participants, which include sellers and service providers like Taobao, abide by 
relevant trademark, copyrights, and consumer protection laws, protect intellectual property, and 
list correct information and advertise accurately.  They also required service providers to record 
the sellers’ IDs, provide channels for dispute resolution and monitor for potential transgressions, 
such as abnormal prices.  They further prohibited online service providers from permitting illicit 
trade.79    
This national regulation was matched by action at the municipal level, as the Beijing 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (BAIC), a municipal administration of the SAIC, 
simultaneously went about testing the limits for government regulation.  Since 2007, as E-
commerce and online counterfeit trading burgeoned, local AICs strengthened their supervisions 
on online stores.  In 2008, the BAIC tested the water of administrative regulation against online 
counterfeits by issuing the Opinions on Implementing the Rules of Promoting Informatization in 
Beijing and Strengthening Regulations of Electronic Commerce.  The Rules of Promoting 
Informatization in Beijing would require online sellers to register for an industrial and 
commercial business license, which all offline business owners had to do.80  The requirement 
was met with sweeping opposition from the E-commerce industry.  Opponents argued that the 
requirement would undermine the flexibility and openness of online commerce, and would 
ultimately impair the development of this new market.81   
As a result of this vehement opposition, the BAIC eventually gave up on the requirement, 
thus failed to implement the Rules.  Nonetheless, in response to the unchecked growth of 
counterfeits on the C2C market, the BAIC formally took the regulation of online counterfeits 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Xi Cui, “Taobao Planning to Spend 100 Million on Fighting Counterfeits [淘宝计划投入 1 亿元展开打假行动],” Sina, Novermber 18, 2009, 
http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2009-11-18/15443604072.shtml. 
77 Xiangru Huang, “Taobao’s Anti-Counterfeiting Achievements are Admirable [淘宝网的打假成绩令人佩服],” iResearch, June 14, 2010, 
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462 封举报信],” Sohu IT, December 25, 2009, Working Platform for Business Integrity, 
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《 关于贯彻落实<北京市信息化促进条例>加强电子商务监督管理》(2008), retrieved from http://tech.sina.com.cn/other/2008-07-
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81 “ How Do Policies Regulate Anti-counterfeiting Effort on the Three Biggest C2C Platforms [政策如何约束 C2C 三大平台打假措施],” China 
B2B Research Center, February 9, 2009, China Market Order, 
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under its wings in 2009.82  The BAIC’s failure to enforce the Rules and its subsequent move bore 
special significance in the government’s early attempts to regulate the C2C market.  The failure 
was one of the earliest demonstrations of the conflict between government regulation and 
business interests.  The lesson was that traditional regulatory tactics, such as formal licensing, no 
longer worked with the novel commercial relationships created by the new technology.  Thus, 
the BAIC’s failure might account for why, in the years to come, the government never attempted 
to impose similar gatekeeping restrictions on individual sellers in the marketplace.   
 
 
Stage Two: Campaigning Against Counterfeits—From Toothless Guidelines to Greater 
Enforcement  (2010-2012) 
 
The year 2010 witnessed an important increase in the regulatory enforcement against 
C2C counterfeits.  Building on the 2009 “100 Million Anti-Counterfeit Plan,” Taobao announced 
in early January that the year 2010 would be Taobao’s Consumer Year, thus identifying 
consumer protection Taobao’s priority of the year.  But unlike the previous plan, Taobao’s 
consumer protection campaign in 2010 encompassed a much broader range of activities that hurt 
consumer interests, including late shipments and deceptions besides counterfeit goods.  Taobao’s 
CEO Lu Zhaoxi explained that the Consumer Year was a response to consumer demand—as 
consumers became more rights-aware, Taobao needed to protect their rights well in order to 
secure its share in the C2C market. 83  Part of the Plan was to establish a 100 million RMB 
consumer protection fund.  If consumers had problems with their purchase, Taobao would use 
the fund to offer consumers compensation.84  Nonethelss, though Taobao’s establishment of the 
fund seemed to be a generous move, the fund only constituted around 0.05 percent of Taobao’s 
gross merchandise volume of 195.1 billion RMB in the previous year.85  
On March 8th, a week before China’s official Consumer Protection Day, Taobao launched 
its consumer rights protection platform, the first business-owned E-commerce consumer 
protection platform in China.  Through the platform, consumers would be able to file and keep 
track of inquiries on their purchases, which Taobao required the sellers to respond to within 48 
hours.  If the sellers failed to meet the time limit, Taobao would intervene.86  The platform also 
furnished detailed information about rights-infringing sellers.87  In the days surrounding March 
15th, the national Consumer Protection Day, Taobao also intensively publicized its efforts and 
resolution in fighting counterfeits through advertisements that featured the slogan, “if you dare to 
buy, I dare to recompense for you loss” on CCTV, the main state television network.88  
Taobao’s anti-counterfeiting campaign in early 2010 signaled the marketplace’s attempt 
to appease both consumers and the government.  By framing the campaign around consumer 
protection, Taobao most likely hoped to demonstrate its resolution to serve the interest of the 	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83 Zhouyuan Duan, “Taobao: 2010 Set as Consumer Year [淘宝网：2010 年为淘宝消费者年],” Zhejiang Market Guide, Janurary 12, 2010, 
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consumers who were hurt by counterfeits.  Its intensified publicity effort surrounding the days of 
the national Consumer Protection Day possibly served an even broader agenda.  Every year on 
Consumer Protection Day, CCTV, directed by the government, would expose businesses that 
infringed consumer rights and welfare on its evening gala viewed by audiences across the 
country.  By advertising intensively on CCTV, Taobao might well intend to appease the 
government and the official broadcast to fortify itself against exposure.   
Taobao also strengthened its efforts to cooperate with brand name companies.  On March 
8th, 2010, Taobao allied with over 20 brand owners including Adidas and Victorinox and 
published the Hangzhou Declaration of Combating Counterfeits, which called for all participants 
in the online market to unite against the online sale of spurious goods.89  It also established 
multiple enforcement mechanisms against counterfeits. First, through an algorithm based on a 
standard price database, the website would now automatically detect and delist abnormally 
priced products.  Second, it hired specialists to inspect the marketplace and take down products 
manually.  Third, consumers could now also report infringing products by simply clicking the 
report button on the product page.  Last but not least, Taobao hired a team of over 2400 
volunteers, whom were non-Taobao employees and consisted partly of college students.  They, 
upon request, would make purchases of suspected counterfeit products and hand them over for 
authentication.  In the second half of 2011, the volunteers had dealt with approximately 0.53 
million pieces of counterfeits.90   
However, these strengthened enforcement mechanisms also generated side effects that hit 
legitimate sellers.  The price filtering system, which was preprogrammed and automatic, 
sometimes mistook discounted genuine goods as counterfeits.  For instance, in 2010, Taobao 
falsely removed a genuine cosmetic product sold by Chen, because the product was priced at 68 
RMB, 1 RMB lower than the standard 69 RMB price indexed in the price filtering system.  It 
took Taobao a month to correct its mistake, causing disruption to Chen’s legitimate business.91  
  
While Taobao launched private campaigns against counterfeits on its website, the 
Chinese government prepared its own battle against counterfeits as part of a broader campaign 
against intellectual property infringement.  This new policy direction reflected the growing 
demand from domestic businesses for stronger intellectual property enforcement, as recognized 
by the vice director of SIPO in his 2012 speech.92  All of the enforcement actions against online 
counterfeits targeted individual sellers rather than the marketplaces like Taobao.  Both of these 	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characteristics were consistent with the government’s focus on nurturing domestic economic 
growth as it went about enforcing intellectual property rights protection.    
One important departure in government regulation toward online counterfeits occurred in 
June 2010, when the SAIC issued the Temporary Regulations of Online Commodity Transaction 
and Services.  This document differed from those issued by the MOFCOM in that it formally 
defined the responsibilities of government regulators, online sellers and online service providers.  
As the major government market regulators, the AICs had the responsibility of monitoring 
businesses and sanctioning the firms that violated the Regulations.  The Regulations also 
specified that online sellers must abide by the Trademark Law, Product Quality Law, Consumer 
Protection Law, Anti-Unfair Competition Law, and Provisions on Administration of Enterprise 
Name Registration.  It further commanded service providers to report infringing activities to the 
AICs and cooperate with the AICs when they discovered infringing activities on the service 
platforms, deepening the integration of private and public regulatory frameworks.  The 
Regulations also defined lower-level AICs’ jurisdictions of e-commerce regulation.93   
More stringent rules were accompanied by at least a show of tougher enforcement.  In 
October 2010, the State Council launched the Special Operation against Intellectual Property 
Infringement and the Production and Sales of Counterfeits.  The six-month long operation would 
shape government enforcement in the years to come.  According to the State Council’s official 
announcement, the purpose of the operation was to lead the executive agencies to intensify 
regulation against counterfeits and intellectual property rights infringing activities, the 
unchecked growth of which “would interrupt market economy, undermine business 
competitiveness and innovations, and impair China’s international reputation.”94  The Operation 
called for both horizontal and vertical cooperation of the government agencies—cooperation 
horizontally among nine ministerial executive agencies and vertically between central and local 
enforcement agencies.  The State Council established a Leadership Committee, located in the 
MOFCOM, to lead and supervise the Operation.  Although the Operation spanned intellectual 
property infringements in different sectors, the State Council specifically mentioned online 
counterfeits and infringing activities as their important targets.95   
One of the most prominent responses to the State Council’s Special Operation was the 
Sword Action against Intellectual Property Infringement and Counterfeits launched by the MPS 
in November 2010, and extending throughout 2011. Like the State Council’s Special Operation, 
the Sword Action broadly targeted intellectual property infringements, but listed online 
counterfeiting as one important focus.96  This campaign could point to significant achievements.  
For instance, in Suzhou, a city near Shanghai, the police confiscated over 400,000 infringing 
goods during the first five months of the Action.  Having discovered that many offline 
counterfeit vendors either purchased theor goods on Taobao or had their own stores on Taobao, 
the Suzhou police placed particular attention on monitoring Taobao stores that distributed goods 
from Suzhou.97    	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As individual agencies launched their own enforcement projects, nine ministerial 
agencies announced an additional intensive, cooperative enforcement action against online 
counterfeit sales.  The nine agencies included the MOFCOM, the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT), the MPS, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), the General 
Administration of Customs (GACC), SAIC, AQSIQ, SIPO, and the State Administration of 
Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (GAPP).  Through this program, the agencies 
aimed to strengthen online counterfeit inspections and investigations, and clarified the 
responsibilities of each jurisdiction. Government agencies also urged C2C platforms such as 
Taobao to implement more stringent self-regulation, especially in southeastern regions where 
sellers concentrated.  They also threatened to close down online platforms where infringements 
prevailed. 98   
As local institutions closest to the physical operations of online businesses, AICs played a 
pivotal role in the government’s battle against online counterfeits.  In 2010, the SAIC launched 
an online platform, which consisted of a search engine and an online database, to supervise 
online transactions.  With the platform, the SAIC hoped to build up a nation-wide information 
network for illicit online transactions, promote greater information sharing with other 
enforcement agencies, consumers, and commercial websites and eventually pressure E-
commerce websites for more stringent self-regulation.  The SAIC picked 10 provincial AICs to 
try out the platform; by 2012, fourteen provincial AICs and 4 municipal AICs had built up 
interconnected online platforms on their own.99   
The AICs also cooperated with other agencies to combat online counterfeits.  In April 
2011, led by the Leadership Committee of the State Council’s Special Operation and in 
cooperation with the MOFCOM, the SAIC dispatched an inspection team to deal with online 
counterfeits in Shandong and Guangdong Provinces.  Seizing shipment and accounting records 
as evidence for illegal activities, the inspection team closed down a number of Taobao and 
EachNet counterfeit stores.  It confiscated more than 12,800 infringing products, including 
knockoffs of international luxury brands such as Burberry and Chanel.100 
The AICs continued its targeted enforcement actions after the Special Operation had 
ended.  In 2012, the SAIC launched a specialized operation against online counterfeits, during 
which it required provincial and local AICs to target enforcement on stores that sold products of 
categories or brands particularly vulnerable to counterfeiting.  It required lower-level AICs to 
locate suspicious stores and vulnerable products through both online searches and offline 
inspections, and to frequently inspect and monitor E-commerce platforms and stores with 
physical addresses in their jurisdictions.101  In 2014, the SAIC launched another specialized 
operation against online counterfeits, the Red Shield Action.  Similar to the one in 2012, this 
operation, also enforced by lower-level AICs, targeted large online transaction platforms and 
categories of goods that were especially vulnerable to counterfeiting.  However, the Red Shield 
Action differed from the earlier operation in that the service platforms played a more significant 
role.  Government regulation relied more heavily on the data provided by the platforms, and the 	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AICs explicitly demanded cooperation and stronger self-regulations from service providers.102  
This shift in the role of service providers reflected the trend of increasing cooperation between 
service platforms and the government that had occurred since 2012.   
The AICs were not the only government enforcement agencies that had taken greater 
advantage of the marketplaces in online counterfeit regulation.  The Quality and Technology 
Supervision Bureaus (QTSBs), the local enforcement agencies of AQSIQ, also utilized Taobao’s 
service as they traced the producers of counterfeits.  In 2012, the Wuhan QTSB received 
consumer complaints about a Taobao vendor selling fake cell phone batteries, a type of product 
far more likely to elicit concern from consumers, brand manufacturers and licensed dealers.  The 
contact information in Taobao’s return system enabled the QTSB to locate the physical address 
of the fake battery seller and to ultimately raid the illicit battery producer.103   
 
 
Stage Three: Increased Cooperation and Strengthened Self-regulation—Moving toward a 
Co-regulation Paradigm and Paving the Way for IPO (2012-2014) 
 
Before 2012, the government and Taobao carried out regulation mostly on separate tracks.  
However, since 2012, government agencies and Taobao have significantly increased cooperation 
in their attempts to reduce online counterfeits.  In 2012, Alibaba reported infringements of more 
than 72 brands to the police, enabling the police to arrest 324 suspects and pursue legal cases 
involving 170 million RMB.104  Taobao and the government further strengthened collaboration 
in the following year.  In March, Taobao, cooperating with governmental quality inspection 
services, introduced a third party quality authentication service.  This service enabled cell phone 
and camera buyers, a group of consumers exceptionally mindful of counterfeits, to have their 
merchandise inspected by expert third parties.  If an inspector proved that the merchandise was 
fake, Taobao would issue the buyer an advance refund before investigating into the seller.105  It is 
worth noting that in August, Taobao also significantly raised the guarantee deposit—the advance 
payment sellers were required to make to Taobao as a guarantee for the authenticity of their 
products—for cell phones from 1,000 RMB to 10,000 RMB.106  In June, under the guidance of 
the MPS, Taobao collaborated with over 20 Chinese Internet companies, including its leading 
competitors, to share information about counterfeits and deceptive advertising.107  The next year, 
Taobao coordinated with the MPS in an enforcement campaign against fake luxuries in eight 	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regions, and attended a MOFCOM conference on anti-counterfeiting, during which businesses 
and service providers offered suggestions about how to improve enforcement efforts.108   
One explanation for this increased cooperation was that the new government regulations 
and statutes had increasingly placed the regulatory burden on service providers.  In 2011, the 
MOFCOM released the draft of Third-Party E-commerce Transaction Platform Service 
Regulations (Draft).  The Regulations requested service providers to regulate vendors and 
protect consumers, without requiring them to report infringing activities to government 
enforcement agencies.109  In 2013, the National People’s Congress passed an amendment to the 
Consumer Protection Law that specifically addressed online marketplaces.  First, the law 
stipulated consumers’ right to regret, correspondingly the right to return any online purchases of 
new goods within seven days of purchase, with the exception of customized goods and food. 
Second, the law commanded that if online marketplaces could not provide consumers the 
accurate name, address and contact information of the infringing sellers, it would be obliged to 
compensate the consumers instead.110  In 2014, the SAIC finalized the Temporary Regulations of 
Online Commodity Transaction and Services and published the Regulations of Online Trading.  
Building on the foundation of the previous Regulations, these new mandates further detailed the 
obligations of sellers and service providers.  It required AIC-registered sellers to display the 
registration on their webpages and service providers to record and verify the IDs of non AIC-
registered sellers.  The latter requirement could be viewed as largely a response to the 
amendment to the Consumer Protection Law.  The Regulations also clarified the amount of fines 
AICs would collect in case of violations.111   
The amendment to the Consumer Protection Law placed significant new demands on 
Taobao’s self-regulatory framework.  By holding the marketplace liable for the sellers’ 
misconducts in the case of incomplete information, the law effectively increased the burden of 
the marketplace to collect and confirm the sellers’ identities.  In response, Taobao updated its 
seller ID system by requesting more detailed information and verifying existing information.  If 
Taobao could not verify the sellers’ information, it would restrict or block their businesses.  
Taobao also required sellers, except for those legally exempted, to provide seven-day return 
service to the consumers. 112   
However, the seven-day return rule created tensions between legitimate sellers and 
Taobao.  Legitimate sellers worried that the new requirements would leave room for buyers to 
make irresponsible or even malicious returns.  The requirement for sellers to provide proof, often 
in the form of invoices, for the authenticity of the contested products also increased the burden of 
individual sellers, especially those who sold items that were part of their personal collections.113 	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Some illicit sellers, meanwhile, came up with creative ways to evade the new rules.  For 
instance, since Taobao’s regulation allowed sellers of second-hand goods to either opt in or out 
of the seven-day return policy, some sellers simply labeled their goods as second-hand, though 
they would inform the customers in their product descriptions that the wares were in fact brand 
new.114   
Illicit sellers found other ways to sidestep the ID registration system.  Some cunning 
sellers registered for a number of storefronts using different IDs.  In this way, if Taobao closed 
down their operating stores, they could transfer all of its business instantly to another storefront 
and ensure the continuance of their business.  Some counterfeit sellers with especially successful 
businesses were unwilling to move to new storefronts and thus lose their existing consumer bases, 
and instead opted for “technological maneuvers” to keep their stores after running afoul of the 
authorities.  For instance, one ex-counterfeit shoes seller revealed that, when Taobao threatened 
to close down their stores, some of his peers would purchase authentic shoes from authorized 
retailers and provide the invoices to Taobao as proofs for the authenticity of their products.  As 
Taobao could not inspect the actual products, such maneuvers could often exonerate the sellers 
from Taobao’s penalties.115   
 Taobao also kept on improving its information sharing channels, yet in doing so revealed 
Alibaba’s differentiated intellectual property priorities in domestic and foreign markets.  In 2012, 
Taobao launched an intellectual property protection platform, through which trademark owners 
could submit links to the infringing products and proofs for infringement to Taobao.  Taobao 
would immediately take down the infringing products upon receipt of the notice.116  Taobao also 
updated its online exposure board, through which it released information about counterfeit sales 
to consumers.117  However, in dealing with brand owner complaints, Alibaba seemed to have 
responded more swiftly to foreign brand owners than to Chinese ones.  While the Taobao portal 
was launched in 2012, Alibaba had launched a similar intellectual property protection portal, 
AliProtect, for foreign rights holders two years earlier.  Through the portal, rights holders could 
file complaints against up to 200 rights-infringing listings at a time, and Alibaba would take 
down the listings upon validating the complaints.  The portal was easily accessible through the 
homepage of Alibaba.com and AliExpress.com, the international B2B and C2C platforms of 
Alibaba’s E-commerce empire.  It also provided search tools to rights holders, enabling them to 
make customized searches for product listings.118  
 The Alibaba Group moved to institutionalize its efforts to protect brand owners in 2013, 
establishing the Intellectual Property Protection Group as a permanent department.  By 
appointing Taobao’s CEO Lu Zhaoxi as the chair of the department, Alibaba clearly wished to 
signal that the company attached a high priority to intellectual property protection.  Continuing 
its increased collaboration with the government, Alibaba invited representatives from the MPS, 
AIC, AQSIQ, SIPO and GAPP to its press conference, where it announced the decision to 
establish the Group.  During the conference, Alibaba further clarified the projected 	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transformation of its strategies to cooperate with the government—a shift “from post-incidence 
notification to timely communication, from notification to information sharing, and from 
temporary initiatives and agreement to embedded rules and regulations.”119   
Although Taobao had been improving its anti-counterfeiting mechanisms and 
strengthening the enforcement over the years, its intensified self-regulation since 2012 played an 
especially important role in the company’s broader business scheme. During this period, Alibaba 
was garnering momentum for one of the biggest moves in the company’s history—the launching 
of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) of stock to deepen its capital base, secure the control of its 
Chinese owners, and extend its capacity to invest in technological infrastructure.  For many years, 
Alibaba’s founder Ma Yun had been struggling to regain control of the Alibaba Group from 
Yahoo! Inc..  While Ma only owned 7.4 percent of Alibaba’s share, Yahoo! owned 40 percent in 
2005 and by 2013, despite the decline, still owned more than 20 percent.  In 2012, Ma Yun and 
Yahoo! reached an agreement, according to which Alibaba could buy back half of Yahoo!’s 
share if it went public before 2016.120  Since then, Alibaba had begun its arduous preparation for 
the IPO.  It originally sought to launch the IPO in Hong Kong, but its negotiation with the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange broke up in the fall of 2013, due to a conflict between Hong Kong’s 
security laws and Alibaba’s pursuit to continue its partnership structure.  After the failure in 
Hong Kong, Alibaba turned to New York for its IPO filing. 121   
To go public, especially in the US where its C2C website Taobao had once been listed as 
a “notorious market” by the government, Alibaba had to take on greater accountability for the 
counterfeits on its websites.  US laws and culture treated intellectual property seriously, and 
many of the contested brands on Taobao were US-owned.  To win the heart of US investors and 
regulators, Alibaba had to at least demonstrate its effort and sincerity to clean the house of its 
C2C online marketplaces.  And Alibaba did—in fact, it impressed the Americans with some 
swift and forceful actions.  For instance, when Innovative Watersports, an American company 
that sold inflatable floating pool toys, notified Alibaba of its discovery of counterfeit toys, 
Alibaba took down the seller within two days’ time.122  Actions of this kind impressed even 
American experts.  Richard Last, a professor of retail marketing from the University of North 
Texas, acknowledged that Alibaba had taken “a much more aggressive stance than I've seen 
taken by U.S. marketplaces, including eBay.”123  In May 2014, Alibaba further toughened up its 
anti-counterfeiting mechanisms by learning from its US counterpart eBay, accelerating Taobao’s 
product removal process and increasing Taobao’s capacity to delist counterfeits.124   
To further polish its reputation in the West, Alibaba also reached out to international 
organizations and European governments.  In 2013, after a year of negotiation, Taobao signed an 
agreement with IACC.  The agreement, according to IACC, had created a collaborative 
framework to address Taobao’s counterfeit problem.125  In the early summer of 2014, Alibaba 
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their luxury industries.  The MOUs aimed at encouraging French and Italian businesses to open 
up stores on Tmall, which would increase the accessibility of authentic French and Italian goods 
and presumably reduce the appeal of counterfeits on Taobao for at least some consumers.126   In 
September, Alibaba announced its partnership with the China-Britain Business Council (CBCC), 
through which it would acquaint British companies with its anti-counterfeit system and 
strengthen its enforcement against fake British products.127  
The pursuit of the IPO was not the sole driving force for the anti-counterfeiting policies 
Taobao had carried out since 2012, and Alibaba never publicly acknowledged the connection 
between its intensified anti-counterfeiting effort and its pursuit of a US IPO.  Nevertheless, 
sellers as well as Western media captured how Alibaba’s IPO plan had created momentum for 
Taobao’s counterfeit regulation.  In an interview with Reuters, a counterfeit luxurious handbag 
seller told the interviewer that he felt Taobao’s regulation had gradually become more stringent, 
and that 2013 was a particularly difficult year for counterfeit sellers because Taobao tightened its 
enforcement due to the IPO.128  Western media, including major press such as CNBC, Wall Street 
Journal, and Reuters, covered Alibaba’s anti-counterfeiting efforts intensively in the run-up 
2014.  The media, while ackowledging Alibaba’s anti-counterfeiting achievements, explicitly 
connected them to the company’s moves to list on the New York Stock Exchange.129  Alibaba 
declined to comment on this purported link, with the excuse of exercising silence in its pre-IPO 
stage.130   
However, Alibaba’s refusal to admit to the link between anti-counterfeiting and the 
pursuit of IPO in no way suggests the lack of such a link.  Alibaba had exhibited full awareness 
of the risk counterfeiting posed to the success of its IPO.  In July 2014, two months before 
Alibaba launched its IPO, Kering, the French producer of well-known luxurious brands such as 
Gucci and Yves Saint Laurent, filed a lawsuit in the US against Alibaba for selling counterfeits 
Kering goods on its websites, particularly Taobao.  Worried that the lawsuit would taint its 
reputation and undermine its IPO, Alibaba responded quickly.  By agreeing to cooperate with 
Kering and offering greater intellectual property protection to its brands, Alibaba successfully 
convinced Kering drop its suit in late August, right before the launch of IPO.131  In its filing to 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission, Alibaba also acknowledged the risks 
counterfeiting posed to its business development.  It identified “allegations and lawsuits claiming 
that items listed on our marketplaces are pirated, counterfeit, or illegal” and “[accusations] of 
infringing intellectual property rights of third parties” as major risk factors.132 
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VI.  Achievements and Limitations of Regulations Against C2C Counterfeits in China 
 
Through internal regulatory enforcement and cooperation with rights holders and 
government enforcement agencies, Taobao managed to take down listings for counterfeits valued 
into the billions of renmibi.  In 2010, Taobao claimed to have received intellectual property 
complaints on 18 million product listings, and subsequently taken down 14 million of them.133  
The number more than quadrupled in 2011, as Taobao claimed to have removed 63.2 million 
infringing product listings, of which 8.7 million were reported by rights holders and 54 million 
were discovered as a result of Taobao’s self-inspection.134  In 2012, Taobao reported that it 
removed 94 million rights infringing listings, which constituted almost ten percent of its total 
product listings.135  In the first two quarters of 2013, it claimed to have penalized 420,000 
counterfeit sellers through active policing.  As it strengthened cooperation with both government 
enforcement agencies and rights holders, it assisted the police with seven cases and penalized 
60,000 rights infringing sellers through collaboration with brand owners.136 
Taobao’s regulatory efforts also gained international recognition.  While the USTR had 
listed Taobao as a “notorious market” in December, 2011, it removed Taobao from the 2012 list, 
acknowledging that the marketplace “has undertaken notable efforts over the past year to work 
with rightholders directly or through their industry associations to clean up its site.”137  However, 
one should keep in mind that Alibaba had undertaken significant efforts to persuade the USTR to 
remove it from the list, going so far as to hire former USTR General Counsel James Mendenhal 
as its lobbyist.  China’s MOFCOM also formally expressed objection to the inclusion of Taobao 
on the list and as coincidental as it might be, the removal of Taobao from the list took place just 
one week before an annual bilateral trade meeting between the two countries.138  Other 
recognitions Taobao earned included an acknowledgement from the Motion Picture Association 
of America, a long-time critic of Taobao’s counterfeiting and piracy issues, in 2012.139  A year 
later, the World Trademark Review (WTR) awarded Alibaba the WTR Industry Award for 
Taobao’s effort to help brand owners address the counterfeits on the marketplace.140   
 
 
The Disputable Technical Defense 
 
 While Taobao and the government have cracked down on a significant number of 
counterfeits, counterfeit selling still remains a highly visible problem on Taobao.  A quick search 	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of almost any widely known luxury brand, especially if using abbreviations or prevalent aliases, 
yields thousands of listings with extraordinarily low prices that make them highly likely, if not 
certainly, to be counterfeits.   
C2C online marketplaces like Taobao and eBay have frequently used technical 
difficulties as excuses to shield themselves from the blame for prevalent listings of counterfeits 
and from the liability to actively police their marketplaces for intellectual property rights 
infringing products.  Both theoretical and practical evidence support their claims of technical 
difficulties.  Scholarly discussions of E-commerce counterfeit regulation have acknowledged of 
the technical challenge to both government regulation and marketplace self-regulation, posed 
mainly by the information asymmetry between the regulators and the sellers.  Gaining access to 
sufficient information to monitor sellers’ behaviors would certainly impose costs.141  
Taobao’s regulation in practice further attests to the technical challenges. In 2013, 
Alibaba’s three Chinese retail websites—Taobao, Tmall and Juhuasuan, hosted a total of 11.3 
billion transactions.  These platforms had approximately 231 million active buyers and 8 million 
active sellers.142  The sheer volume of transactions and users made it very difficult for the 
marketplace to review the information of every transaction.  Dealing with counterfeit complaints 
in such a huge marketplace was not an easy task either.  By 2012, Taobao’s Security Department 
employed approximately 2,000 personnel to deal with intellectual property infringing issues, and 
in the same year it removed 94 million rights infringing listings.143  According to these data, each 
Security Department specialist, on average, had dealt with 47,000 infringing listings in a year 
and 129 listings per day.  Given such a taxing workload, it seemed that without further 
expanding its Security Department, Taobao could barely have done any better in removing 
counterfeit listings on its site.   
However, other facts raise questions about the validity of the technical defense.  A quick 
search experiment of fake Tory Burch handbags shows how easy it is to discover counterfeit 
goods on Taobao.  As Taobao relies on filtering keywords, such as brand names, in product 
descriptions to monitor potential infringements, illicit sellers have learned to evade Taobao’s 
inspection by avoiding the use of complete brand names in their product descriptions.144  For 
instance, sellers of counterfeit Tory Burch handbags often refer to their bags as “tb bag.”  A 
search of “Tory Burch bag” on Taobao yielded thousands of listings of bags mostly with prices 
of 1000 RMB ($160) and above, the normal price range of authentic Tory Burch bags.  A search 
of “tb bag”, however, yielded Tory Burch-looking products mostly as cheap as a few hundred 
renminbi (approximately ranging from $20 to $100).  While it is difficult to tell if a $300 Tory 
Burch bag is authentic, a $30 “Tory Burch Bag” almost labels itself as a knock-off.  
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A search experiment using keywords “tb handbag” generated “Tory Burch,” “MCM,” and “Michael Kors” 
bags with prices ranging from approximately $20 to $120. 145 
 
Even though it is difficult for Taobao to monitor every transaction or respond to every 
complaint, conducting quick searches and taking down abnormally priced counterfeit items 
demand little human resources.  With its price-detection system that can automatically delist 
abnormally priced goods,146 Taobao should be technically capable of filtering out and taking 
down counterfeits in massive volumes, especially if its enforcement teams scrutinize the 
widespread tactic of evading problematic search terms.  The implicit question in the technical 
defense, therefore, seemed to be less about technical capability and more about the willingness to 
regulate.   
Brand owners have raised similar critiques of Alibaba’s ability and willingness to take 
down counterfeits.  A New York-based European beauty manufacturer, Coty, brought suit 
against Alibaba in Berlin in early 2014 for the selling of counterfeit Coty perfumes on 
AliExpress.com and Alibaba.com.  A key question Coty raised during the process was the 
technically feasibility for Alibaba to operate software that could detect counterfeits on its site.  
The company further challenged Alibaba’s alleged active policing policy, citing its inaction 
toward the fake L’Oreal products listed on the same store that sold fake Coty products.147  Such 
challenges to Taobao’s technical incapability further suggest that perceived business interests, 
rather than technologies, are the greatest barriers to effective regulation against counterfeits.   	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The Flying Apple Tree—Regulatory Success or Failure? 
 
A detailed consideration of an individual Taobao seller, The Flying Apple Tree, who has 
faced allegations of counterfeit selling, further suggests the regulatory complexity surrounding 
Chinese regulation of online counterfeit goods.  The fall and revival of The Flying Apple Tree 
demonstrated the success of marketplace and government coordination, but also quite significant 
subsequent enforcement failures.  Consumer reactions to the fall of the store also reflected how 
many consumers perceived online counterfeit luxuries and their sellers.   
For several years, The Flying Apple Tree had been a successful store on Taobao. It sold 
counterfeit clothes and accessories of Western luxury brands.  Although the store’s products 
were much cheaper than genuine ones, they were substantially more expensive than the bulk of 
the counterfeit luxuries on Taobao.  Denouncing the same but cheaper products sold by other 
sellers as low-quality knock-offs, Li boasted of the authenticity of her products and proudly 
attributed their cheapness to the “insider channels” which allowed her to acquire products 
directly from the Chinese producers.  This selling strategy, which promised alleged genuine and 
high-quality luxury products at discounted prices, attracted many loyal customers and brought 
her financial success.  Within six months after her store’s opening in 2010, the store’s revenue 
reached 20 million RMB (more than 3 million dollars).148   
The store’s profitability came to a halt when, according to online rumors, a long-time 
client from Hong Kong reported the store to Taobao.149 Based on the client’s report, Taobao’s 
Security Department investigated the store.  The team analyzed its transaction data and, upon 
confirmation, reported the store to the police in Hangzhou, where the physical address of the 
store was located.  The police confiscated Li’s inventories in Hangzhou and coordinated with the 
Guangdong police, who busted several factories in Guangdong Province that manufactured 
counterfeit products for Li.  As Li’s revenue from selling counterfeits well exceeded the 50,000 
RMB threshold in the Criminal Law, the police arrested her for trademark infringement and 
counterfeit selling.150    
The take-down of The Flying Apple Tree was a successful attempt of Taobao’s self-
regulation and police enforcement, as well as the voluntary cooperation between Taobao and 
government enforcement agencies.  However, though Li had just been arrested in the winter of 
2013, past customers of The Flying Apple Tree received text messages in the following spring 
from the store’s customer service, which notified them that The Flying Apple Tree had moved its 
storefront to Follow the Heart.  Past customers of The Flying Apple Tree speculated in an online 
forum about Li’s whereabouts.  Some argued that Li had been released without prosecution, 
while others disagreed and believed the store was taken over by Li’s sister.151  There had been no 
official record of the aftermath of Li’s arrest, yet the opening of Follow the Heart nonetheless 
confirmed Taobao’s enforcement failure caused by a loophole inherent in Taobao’s ID 
registration mechanism.  Counterfeit sellers whose IDs were blocked by Taobao could easily 	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evade the rule by registering for another storefront using someone else’s ID, such as a relative’s.  
Therefore, in this case, regardless of whether Li was released or not, she or others could easily 
continue the business of The Flying Apple Tree by registering a new store with another ID.   
The business revival of The Flying Apple Tree demonstrated the challenges Taobao faced 
in combating counterfeits.  With Taobao’s existing enforcement mechanisms, it would only 
discover the new store if it ran a key word search to filter suspicious products, or if consumers or 
brand owners filed a claim.152  Both channels, however, were very limited in this case.  First, 
product descriptions on both The Flying Apple Tree and Follow the Heart avoided directly 
referring to the brand names the products were mimicking.  Instead, they would use alias and 
abbreviations to hint the customers, such as referring “Burberry” as “B brand” or “Chanel” as 
“Miss C.”   Second, customers of the stores were often conscious of the fact that the products 
were, or highly likely to be, knock-offs but still made their purchase for the low price.  
According to online rumors, The Flying Apple Tree was reported by a customer not because of 
the customer’s objection to counterfeits but rather a personal falling out with the storeowner.153  
When the police contacted some customers of The Flying Apple Tree during their investigation, 
some even complained of losing a place to shop for cheap “branded” gifts if the police closed 
down the store.154   
Consumers’ comments to The Flying Apple Tree on an online forum further sheds light 
on why consumer reports would not work effectively as a way to curb the counterfeit stores.  In 
November 2013, not long after the close down of The Flying Apple Tree, some past customers of 
the store started a conversation thread on Tianya.com, a large and influential Chinese online 
forum.155  They discussed and speculated what happened to the store and its owner, expressed 
anger toward Li’s conduct, and lauded the demise of the once profitable store.  Ironically, most 
of them were not angry at Li’s conduct of selling counterfeits. Instead, they were outraged by the 
higher prices she charged compared with other counterfeit sellers, the products’ low quality that 
contradicted her guarantee, and her condescending attitudes.  Despite Li’s firm claims that her 
products were genuine, most participants in the conversation seemed to be fully aware of the fact 
that the products were in fact knock-offs.  The sentiments of the participants of this conversation 
thread further confirmed that many consumers of counterfeit luxuries knowingly purchased the 
knockoffs as they were drawn by the low prices.  Thus, not surprisingly, few consumers, indeed 
perhaps no consumers, would report the new store to Taobao or to the police. 
 
 
VII. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research  
 
A close examination of the development of government regulation and Taobao’s self-
regulation against counterfeits shows that the regulatory regime has gradually shifted from 
independent government regulation and marketplace self-regulation to co-regulation.  Both the 
government and the online marketplace began building regulatory initiatives in 2006, dedicating 
their resources to rule-making and infrastructure building that set the stage for the enforcement in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152“Taobao’s High Profile Anti-Counterfeiting Campaigns Suspected for US IPO [淘宝高调打假 被疑为赴美上市 ],” IT Time Weekly, August 
7, 2013, http://www.ittime.com.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=83&id=4355. 
153 “Taobao’s Flying Apple Tree was Closed Down [淘宝上大名鼎鼎的“飞翔苹果树”家被封店了],” Tianya BBS, November 7, 2013, 
accessed September 10, 2014, http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-funinfo-4747037-1.shtml. 
154“Would an Online Storeowner who Fly to Fashion Shows Sell Counterfeits.” 
155 To see the original conversation thread, see on Tianya BBS at http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-funinfo-4747037-1.shtml. 
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later years.  Since 2010, both regulators have sharpened their regulatory teeth with greater 
enforcement, frequently in the form of concentrated, publicized campaigns.  With the maturation 
of the C2C online market and the clarification of the scope and liabilities of regulation, the 
government and the marketplace have increased cooperation since 2012, developing a 
collaborative co-regulatory regime.156   
In light of the lack of access to internal government and Taobao documents, one must be 
careful in attributing motivations to the Chinese anti-counterfeiting policies. Nonetheless, the 
dominant forces that appear to have driven the formulation of regulatory policies and shaped the 
enforcement efforts have been the interests of two primary domestic regulators, which in turn 
reflect the conflicting interests of other key participants in C2C online trading.  The development 
of government regulation against C2C online counterfeits echoed the government’s wider agenda 
of intellectual property governance.  Government regulation has generally manifested a tendency 
to prioritize perceived domestic economic interests over other considerations.  While the 
government has strengthened its enforcement as the regulatory demands from foreign institutions 
and domestic businesses increased since around 2010, it nevertheless remained protective of 
Taobao’s ongoing capacity to secure the growth of a pivotal domestic business infrastructure.  
Government enforcement actions have consistently targeted individual counterfeit sellers.  
Although recent legislation and administrative rules have placed greater burden on the 
marketplace, there has not been a single enforcement action against the online marketplace itself.   
Multiple factors have shaped Taobao’s self-regulatory framework and determined the 
effectiveness of the regulation, but Taobao’s need to meet the demand from other stakeholders 
and thus to fulfill its business interests seemed to have been, above all, the steering force.  The 
passage of the laws that transferred greater liabilities on Taobao and Taobao’s pursuit of IPO 
overseas did alter Taobao’s strategic calculations, leading it to place greater weight on 
governmental expectations and the demands of foreign interests.  Taobao responded by 
tightening the regulatory oversight of its sellers, which eventually led to the institutional shift 
from independent regulation to greater cooperation with the government and international 
stakeholders.  
The contrast between the prevalence of counterfeits on Taobao and the seemingly 
substantial and intensifying regulation, carried out by both the marketplace and the government, 
further demonstrates the complexity of online counterfeit regulation in China.  For all the 
international accolades that Taobao has received for its more stringent post-2011 policies, it 
continues to deflect calls for yet stronger actions through appeals to the technical limits posed by 
online marketplaces.  Nonetheless, the problem of information asymmetries and creative evasion 
of filtering algorithms can also be overcome by a combination of adaptive technology and 
enforcement strategies that focus on evasive marketing strategies.    
As in the case with so many contexts of business self-regulation, the commitment to 
regulate online counterfeit sales in China has depended heavily on the pressure exerted by the 
government.  Heightened government concern over the consequences of online counterfeits, 
perhaps best demonstrated by the ratification of laws and administrative rules that increased the 
regulatory burden of the marketplaces, pressed Taobao to adjust its regulatory strategies. 
Nonetheless, the widespread prevalence of counterfeit listings despite the more stringent 
regulatory frameworks imposed since 2011, the still limited enforcement of established laws and 
marketplace rules, and the arguably inefficient use of anti-counterfeiting mechanisms raise 
questions about the depth of regulatory commitment in this arena.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 See Appendix 1 for a multi-layered chronology of the regulatory development. 
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The Chinese regulation of online counterfeits have indeed demonstrated an expedient 
character through the regulators’ attempt to advance certain interests over the others, which 
would often seem to override their attempt to redress the general phenomenon.  The Chinese 
government has weighed domestic business interests more heavily than foreign ones as it sought 
to balance them on a scale that maximizes the benefits to domestic economy.  Many brands that 
are severely plagued by counterfeiting are owned by foreign companies, yet Taobao, whose 
business is likely to have benefited from the trading of counterfeits, contributes a great share to 
the country’s economic development.  The counterfeit production chain also matters to the 
country’s manufacturing industries, which are important pillars of the country’s productivity and 
employment.  For executives at Taobao and Alibaba, there are strong reasons to exercise 
flexibility in choosing whose interests to protect.  By establishing the intellectual property portal 
at an earlier time for foreign rights holders, for instance, they prioritized foreign business 
interests over domestic ones.  By implementing stricter restrictions on counterfeit electronic 
products and looser ones on counterfeit luxuries, they arguably sought to advance the “best” 
interests of Chinese consumers.  The overarching principle, nonetheless, would seem to involve 
advancing direct and immediate business concerns, such as profit and capital, over indirect ones, 
such as preserving the products’ brand value or wider consumer confidence in C2C E-commerce.  
The more skeptical eyes may be inclined to view the Chinese regulation of C2C 
counterfeits as a symbolic show—an attempt by the regulators to convince the anti-counterfeiting 
coalition that they mean business without actually compromising Taobao’s business model that 
continues to include scope for the sale of highly demanded counterfeit goods.  While it is clear 
that the Chinese government and Taobao have at times prioritized interests fulfillment over 
counterfeit reduction, more accurate measurements of their enforcement efforts would be helpful 
to assess the exact nature of the regulation.  For instance, while Taobao claimed to have delisted 
tens of millions of counterfeits from its websites each year, an accurate measurement or reliable 
estimate of the total amount of counterfeits on the website would reveal whether the seemingly 
substantial achievement was actually only trivial.  Measurements or estimates of the changes in 
the numbers of counterfeit listings and sellers would reveal the actual impact of the regulation on 
counterfeit selling.  Evaluations of Taobao’s financial capacity for regulatory investment would 
further shed light on its regulatory commitment. 
One should also be cautious that, though the Chinese regulators appear to have used 
online counterfeit regulation to advance their perceived best interests, their policy choices are not 
necessarily the best means to serve those interests, if they have correctly identified their best 
interests at all.  Alternative regulatory strategies might have been more effective at advancing the 
goals of stimulating the economy and promoting business development, and both Taobao and the 
Chinese government might have misconceived their interests.  Moreover, regulatory decisions, 
like all other policy decisions, are frequently affected by both state and corporate politics.  What 
appear as the “best interests” may well have been the results of political compromise.  Further 
studies with access to internal government and Taobao documents will better expose the policy-
making processes, and cost-benefit analysis of current and alternative policies will help evaluate 
how effectively Chinese regulation serves the interests of different stakeholders.  
 
The development of regulation against C2C online counterfeits in China also reveals the 
limits of transnational regulatory governance of online intellectual property.  The Internet has 
truly globalized the market by blurring the physical boundaries between countries, offering brand 
owners greater stakes in foreign markets.  However, without direct access of and control over the 
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foreign marketplaces, brand owners have to rely heavily, if not completely, on intermediaries 
like E-commerce platforms to help them regulate against infringements of their rights.  Yet as the 
case in China demonstrates, the prerogative has almost always been in the hands of the 
intermediary, Taobao, who has only selectively fulfilled the external demand based on its 
business interests.  As the only private entity that has direct control over the marketplace, 
Taobao’s power in the transnational regulatory regime proved to be disproportionate.  Yet the 
brand owners have had little leverage other than resorting to lawsuits, unless Taobao had direct 
business dealings in their countries, such as Alibaba’s pursuit of IPO in the US.   
However, the overseas ventures of online commerce companies like Alibaba also open up 
new opportunities for foreign brand owners and other potential foreign and international 
regulators.  As Alibaba ventured into the US capital market and expanded its business in western 
countries, it is now accountable to foreign investors, more exposed to the scrutiny of foreign 
brand owners and media, and more vulnerable to foreign and international oversight.  The IPO 
and market expansion have raised Alibaba and its business component Taobao to the 
international playing field, offering foreign brand owners opportunities to gain greater control of 
the marketplace and increasing their capacity to regulate through the intermediaries.  The 
overseas expansion of Alibaba will also likely provide incentives for the company to become a 
more dutiful regulatory intermediary in order to ensure its continuing success in the western 
consumer and capital market. 
Whether brand owners will effectively take advantage of the opportunities is nonetheless 
open to question.  While brand owners have claimed firm opposition to the counterfeits on 
Taobao, they have generally taken few aggressive measures to urge Taobao to take them down.  
It is possible that brand owners can tolerate counterfeits to a certain extent.  It is also possible 
that online counterfeits, which are affordable to a wider range of consumers, benefit the brand 
owners by helping spread their names.  In fact, a study has shown that more than 40 percent of 
the counterfeit luxuries users would convert into genuine luxuries users as their income 
increased.157 As every petition against online counterfeits generates costs, the potential gain from 
the petitions may be so small that it is unworthy of the brand owners’ effort.  None of these 
potentialities conflict with brand owners’ attacks on online counterfeits, as failure to denounce 
counterfeits may lead to the slippery slope that enervates the brands’ position in future trademark 
disputes.  Further research into the brand owners’ incentives, perceptions and strategic decision-
making could help test these hypotheses and contribute to assessing the role of brand owners in 
the transnational governance of intellectual property.  Potential research directions include 
analysis of the brands’ position demonstrated in its internal records, publications and past 
lawsuits, as well as quantitative studies on the size of the counterfeits market and the benefits 
and losses it incurs.  
Last but not least, E-commerce has truly globalized the goods market by eliminating the 
physical boundaries, and the process is facilitated by the multi-nationalization of the companies 
that host E-commerce.  Regardless of how each player reacts, the new market is challenging the 
traditional model of intellectual property regulation and calling for a new and more effective 
model for transnational intellectual property governance.  Studies of how international players 
have responded to the rising challenge will offer greater insights into the design of an optimal 
transnational regulatory framework.  Information including whether and how international 
organizations, such as the WTO and IACC, have envisioned the framework, and how, if any, E-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Renée Gosline, “The real value of fakes: Dynamic symbolic boundaries in socially embedded consumption” (doctor’s thesis, Harvard Business 
School, 2009), 36. 
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commerce companies around the world have interchanged ideas or even collaborated on 
designing their transaction rules would be very helpful.   
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Appendix—A Chronology of the development of C2C online counterfeit regulation in China 
